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PREFACE
Relations with the Soviet Union were essential issues to United States foreib'll and
military pohcy for a large part of the Twentieth Century. The legacies of many American
presidents have been determined by their skill in handling this Issue The Reagan
presidency was vital in changing the face of relations with the U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet
Sociaiist Republics). One of the key issues in relations to the Soviet Union was the
proper size and focus of United States' nuclear forces. Although Reagan spent eight
years in office addressing the issue of his nation's nuclear armaments, the basis of many
of his policies to the Soviet Union was formed during his presidential campaign in 1980
and his first three years in office. The conduct of the Carter administration and Reagan' s
criticism of it fonned another important element in the formation of his nuclear doctrine.
Reagan harshly criticized the nuciear policies of his predecessor and their effects on
nationai defense and foreign policy. in the first days of his presidency, Reagan promised
to improve the country's position in these maners by increasing the strength of its nuclear
defense. In i983, President Reagan asked the country to allow him another term to
pursue his goais for the United States. The nation complied, and Ronald Reagan went on
[0 be the dominant voice in United States' military and foreign policy in the decade. One
of the most emphasized areas of Reagan' s first term was his nuclear poiicies. It IS
important to examine the actuai effectiveness of these policies. One needs to examine
the question of whether President Reagan fulfilled to the promises made on nuclear
policies in his first days in office.
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of President Reagan's nuclear
doctrine on United States' defense, its ability to conduct foreign policy, and domestic
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confidence in safety from nuclear war. The thesis ofthis work is that despite promises to
improve conditions in the nation quickly through a change in nuclear doctrine in a rapid
fashion, the first three years of the Reagan administration's nuclear anns doctri ne caused
a slight decline in United States defense, foreign policy, and public approval compared to
the previous administration. Reagan gained considerable support in his presidential
campaign by criticizing the nuclear policies and foreign pol icies of President Carter.
After his election, Reagan promised to enhance national security rapIdly through a new
nuclear program based on modernization of United States' forces. He reasoned
improvement on the nation's nuclear forces would put it in a better position to negotiate
anns reduction treaties with the Soviet Union, making the United States' doubly
protected from nuclear attack. However, the early years of the Reagan administration
suffered some of the same problems in its nuclear policy as President Carter had. Public
opinion was aligned against the policies of both presidents for much of their tenns.
Members of Congress and the country's European allies reacted negatively to both
nuclear programs and questioned their credibility and feasibility. However, conditions
grew worse under Reagan. The United States' European allies became increasingly
hostile to the administration's nuclear doctrine because of their fears that the
administration was jeopardizing the security of Europe. A portion of the American
public expressed its concern through books, films, and rising memberships in nuclear
protest groups. Polls indicated the United States' public was increasingly concerned over
the threat of nuclear war and believed that Reagan, not the Soviet Union was the chief
antagonist.
It is important to recognize the limitations of gauging overall public opinion
through film, literature, newspaper editorials, and polls. One must realize that the upper
class and educated elites in American society, who often held more liberal views than
Reagan, enjoyed great influence on the content offilm and literature. Public opinion
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polls can also be misleading because they have the the potential manipulated by those
who conduct them. This can be done by wording questions in a certain fashion to make
one side of an issue seem more attractive. It is also reasonable to conclude that the
content of literature and mass media productions do not equally represent portions of
American society outside of their producers. While keeping these qualifications in mind,
the evidence presented in this work \\Till demonstrate Reagan's nuclear policies spurned a
substantial reaction from the elite and liberal portions of the American public, as seen in
films, literature, and polls. This work will refer to the terms "public" and "public
opinion" with these considerations in mind.
Reagan's early nuclear doctrines on national defense, foreign policy, and society
have not been specifically or completely addressed in secondary historical literature.
Larger works address this issue in fragments or brevity, but none give it comprehensive
attention. However, there are various interpretations available on the motivation behind
Reagan's overall defense program as well as comparisons of it to the Carter
administration. These interpretations partially relate to the topic of this work and deserve
attention.
The dominant secondary interpretation on the motivation behind Reagan's
nuclear buildup is that the administration's program was greatly formulated by
conservative advisors of the president. This interpretation holds that Reagan was
somewhat dominated by the wishes of his advisors. In The Reaian Doctrine, Mark
Lagon argues that the beliefs of conservative advisors played a key role in formulating
United States' policy on military issues.] This view is also held by Lou Cannon in
President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. Cannon argues Reagan's advisors provided
the majority of direction in the administration's plan to modernize the country's nuclear
]Mark Lagon, The Reacan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold
War's Last Chapter. (Westport, CN; Praeger, 1994), 154.
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forces. He cited the administration's advocation of the building of the MX Missile as a
particular example of this trend. 2
In explaining how the administration justified its buildup, the majority of
historians have expressed two arguments. One of these interpretations is the
administration claimed that the inadequacies of the Carter administration had
dangerously weakened the country. Michael Staak makes this claim in The Reaian
Administration: A Reconstruction of American Strenlnh?, edited by Helga Haftendom
and Jakob Schissler. Staak argues Reagan justified his nuclear buildup by constantly
pointing back to the failures of the Carter administration in its dealings with the Soviet
Union, the dangers it posed to United States' national security, and the need for a drastic
change through an increased emphasis on defense. 3 Others argue that the United States
had a moral duty to establish peace through a strong foreign policy and military
influence. This view is articulated by Christian Tuchnoff in the Haftendom and Schissler
compilation. Tuchnoff argues that Reagan believed in the moral mission of the United
States to police the world and applied this belief to his foreign policy.4
Two conflicting interpretations emerge in historical analyses of the overall
military policies of President Reagan compared to those of past administrations. One
argument is that Reagan used many of the same methods in dealing with the Soviet
Union, following the policy of containment, increasing military readiness, and attempting
negotiation to resolve conflict. This view is represented by Louisa Hulett in From Cold
Wars to Star Wars. Hulett argues Reagan's policies are particularly similar to those of
2Lou Cannon, President Reag:an: A Role of a Lifetime. (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1991), 168.
3Helga Haftendom and Jakob Schjssler, eds. The Rea2an Administration' A
Reconstruction of American Stren21h? (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 103.
4Ibid., 121.
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Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. 5 The contrasting interpretation is seen in On The
Brink, by Jay Wink. He argues that Reagan broke from past presidents by aggressively
employing military confrontation and brinksmanship to encourage peace. Wink
concludes these new policies decreased the chances the United States would have to face
the Soviet Union in nuclear conflict. 6
This work seeks to fill a gap in the secondary literature concerning the specific
etTects of Reagan's first three years in oftice on defense, foreib'Tl policy, and society. It
will address the early years of the presidency and the effectiveness of Reagan's nuclear
program. It will also compare the merits of Reagan' nuclear doctnne to the heavily
criticized Carter administration. This work will finally seek to refine the conclusions of
eXisting secondary work when applicable to the focus of its study. I would like to express
my appreciation to Dr. Laura Belmonte for her guidance and support in the \vriting of this
work and in my other graduate studies. I also wish to thank Dr. Joseph Stout and Dr.
George Jewsbury for serving on my thesis advisory committee and lending their advice
on this work. In addition, this study was vastly improved with the valuable assistance of
Mr. John Phillips and his staff in the Government Documents Department at the Edmon
Low Library I also wish to express my thanks to Or. John Maple, Dr. John Thompson,
and Dr. Jim Wilson for their inspiration and guidance while pursuing my bachelor's
degree at Oklahoma Christian University.
SLouisa Hulett, From Cold Wars to Star Wars (New York: University Press of
America, 1988),43.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENT CARTER'S NUCLEAR ARMS
DOCTRINE AND THE EFFECTS ON FOREIGN POLICY
To examine the effects of President Reagan's nuclear policies, one must assess
the condition of national defense and foreign policy under the previous administrations.
In the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter criticized the foreign policy of President
Gerald Ford and called for changes in the country's approach to defense. Caner
criticized Ford for the deterioration of United States-Soviet relations under his tenure.
Caner stated that Ford's administration had been based on "style and spectacular,"
instead of focusing on improving relations between the superpowers. He argued that
under Ford's leadership, the United States had lost respect in the world. I Carter's
solution to this problem began with a commitment to addressing domestic problems in
the nation in order to project a strong presence abroad. Caner's vision for foreign policy
largely entailed infusing the morality of the American people into government decision
making. In his 1976 campaign, Caner promised to involve Congress and American allies
in the formation of the nation's foreign policy and decision making. Carter stated this
involvement of Congress and allies was a positive contrast from the secretive decision-
making processes of the Ford and Nixon administrations. 2 In addition, Caner called for a
reduction in the nation's defense budget while maintaining parity in strategic weapons
with the Soviet Union.
'Sydney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976 (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1979),476.
2Ibid.,480.
2
In the presidential campaign of 1976, Carter took advantage of the decline of
detente that occurred during the Ford presidency. Detente, a period of relaxed tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union, began under the presidency of Richard
Nixon from 1969 to ]973. Nixon granted the Soviet Union Most favored Nation Status
and successfully negotiated a nuclear anns reduction treaty at the Strategic Anns
Limitation Talks (SALT). However, doubts began to arise as to Ford's ability to continue
these positive and relaxed relations with the Soviets. In response to Soviet aggression in
Angola. Ford removed the Most Favored Nation status on the Soviet Union) However,
Ford continued to attempt negotiation on nuclear weapons reduction. Ford's attempts to
negotiate a second agreement at the SALT II negotiations met resistance from the
conservative elements of the Republican party and the general public. They reacted
negatively to Ford's willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union while it conducted
aggressive international activities and violated human rights. In The Rise and Fall of
Detente, Richard Stevenson argues that public approval aligned against trus type of
"amoral" foreign policy with the Soviet Union. H~ also states detente was declining as
the] 976 election approached. 4 Carter's message of infusing morality into foreign policy
helped him publicly challenge the policies of Ford.
Upon election, Carter presented the foreign policy goals of his admini stration and
began to take action on his campaign promises. In short, he proposed to improve
relations with the Soviet Union and China, commit to the global promotion of human
rights, and promote international cooperation to solve the threat of nuclear waLl He
promised to make strategIc decisions towards dealing with the Soviet Union more public
3Stevenson, Richard W., The Rise and Fall of Detente: Relaxations of Tension in
US-Soviet Relations (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), ]74.
4Ibid., 13.
'Haas, Garland A, Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland and Company, Jnc, ]992),98.
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to allies and the American public.6 Carter selected Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State,
promising to conduct foreign policy with less "fanfare" than the previous administration.
He appointed Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense. Brown had gained notoriety for his
killing of many military defense programs while previously working at the Department of
Defense. 7 Conservatives in Congress resented this selection based on Brown's history of
resisting defense expenditures. Carter selected Paul Warnke, a favorite of dovish
members in Congress, to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1977.
Warnke believed that the United States should adopt a policy of restraint in its buildup of
nucJear weapons while calling for the Soviet Union to do the same. This policy of
decreasing nucJear production, in hopes the Soviets would follow suit, greatly disturbed
conservative defense analysts. Despite this criticism, Carter called Warnke's policies
"sound" at the time of his selection.R These selections suggested Carter planned to reduce
the previous atmosphere of confrontation and encourage cooperation wlth the Soviet
Union. Carter advertised this policy as a change from the confrontational styles of Nixon
and Ford.
Carter's stance on nuclear defense was based on the theory of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD), wich guided U.S. foreign policy since the 1960's. Under this belief,
the United States was safe from a nuclear attack as long as it held enough nuclear
weapons to devastate the Soviet Union. Under MAD, this nuclear strength would deter
the Soviet Union from nuclear attack because it would ensure the destruction of both
sides. Government documents continn that President Carter held enough weapons to
inflict serious damage on the Soviet Union. Carter felt safe in that this was the case at the
time of his election. In fact, he felt the United States held an edge compared to the Soviet
6U.s. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington,
D.C. :Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1977),
Jimmy Carter, 1977, 1:94.
7Haas, Jimmy Carter, 52.
~.S. President, Public Papers, 1977, 1:94.
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Union. In 1977, he declared '"At the present time, my judgment is that we have superior
nuclear capability" compared to the Soviets9 This assertion was supported by other
government agencies. According to a 1978 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study,
United States' forces could destroy at least 80% of all Soviet industry and more than 90%
of its military targets. 10
Carter had experience in the military and with nuclear power to base his beliefs
on. Before his political career, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant second grade in his
seven years of service in the U.S. Navy. Before resigning from the military, he was
scheduled to serve as chief engineer on the Seawolf, a prototype nuclear submarine.
During his time in the military, Carter took college courses on nuclear physics and
technology. II This exerience adds validity to Carter's conclusions on nuclear weapons
and the military.
This CBO study also illuminates some problems in American nuclear forces in
1978. The Minuteman Missile, a staple of the nation's nuclear force, was considered
increasingly vulnerable to attack as the Soviets improved their nuclear forces. U.S.
officials questioned the Minuteman missile's ability to survive a first nuclear strike. The
CBO study stated the possibility of a strong threat to Minutemen missiles due to
improvements in Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that targeted them.
The Soviets were developing Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
(MIRVs) on their nuclear missiles. The MIRV technology was seen as a substantial
threat to Minutemen silos, or holding facilities. 12 Furthermore, the silos in which
Minuteman missiles were held were not comparable to those used by the Soviet Union.
Soviet ICBM missiles were in hardened silos, which stood a higher chance of surviving a
9U.S. President, Public Papers, 1977 , 1:95.
IOCongressional Budget Office, Planning Nuclear Forces for the 1980's
(Washington, DC: CBO, 1978), 2.
1IBurton Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr (Lawrence, KS:




nuclear attack than the sl10s holding United States' missiles. The CBO stated that the
country would have to develop new weapons in order to destroy the Soviet silos, where
most of the Soviet's nuclear force was held. l ) These findings also indicated the need for
improvement in the survivability of United States' missile silos.
One of the remedies being considered during Carter's presidency for improving
the United States' nuclear forces was the MX missile. Proponents of this initiative called
for a configuration ofmissiles randomly moved among thousands of protective shelters
similar to the Soviet hardened silos. The CBO anticipated a force of 200 to 300 MX
missiles would be less vulnerable to nuclear attack than the existing force of 1,000
Minutemen ICBMs. The actual ability ofMX missiles to survive a nuclear attack in a
superior fashion to Minutemen was hotly debated during the Carter administration.
In his first two years, Carter did not favor the deployment of the MX system.
He viewed the missile as unnecessary because of his claim of adequate deterrence
capabilities against the Soviet Union. By 1978, increasing pressure from analysts writing
in defense journals and falling public approval spurred Carter to call for various
improvements to the country's nuclear abilities in 1978. To address the problem of
hitting hardened Soviet ICBM silos, Carter requested funds to begin the development of a
transport jet to carry cruise missiles to attack missile sites. The CBO study stated that the
deployment of this jet "could provide enough additional bomber-launched weapons to
target Soviet ICBM silos in a second strike."J4 While providmg a solution to hitting
Soviet cites, this bomber did not solve the problem of U.S. ICBMs being less protected
than Soviet missiles. Carter did show initiative in respect to the problem of inequality in
missile silos, but did not seek to rectify the situation through nuclear buildup or the
pursuit of qualitative equality with Soviet forces. Carter stated in 1978 that the United




advantages would maintain an "equivalence in strategic nuclear strength" between the
superpowers. 15
In addition, the CBO concluded that the problem of Minuteman comparative
vulnerability would not be solved through Carter's anns reduction negotiations with the
Soviet Union, such as the Second Strategic Anns Limitation Talks (SALT II). This treaty
proposed a decrease in the strategic forces by both the United States and the Soviet
Union. Carter promised that these reductions would be equal by both nations. In
addition, he promised the reductions by the Soviets would be verifiable and that the
United States' deterrence abilities "will remain overwhelming."16 However, the CBO
concluded that the stipulations of SALT II would not prevent the Soviets from
developing the capability to destroy the vast majority of Minutemen forces. Under SALT
II, the Soviet Union could still target two nuclear warheads to each Minuteman silo. 17
Further criticism arose to SALT, one of the most significant products of Carter's foreign
policy. Senator Henry Jackson called the proposed treaty an illustration of United States
fatigue in the Cold War and the administration's ineffectiveness in influencing the leaders
of the Soviet Union who "only understood strength."IR Even Senator Edmund Muskie, a
political ally of Carter, called the intentions of SALT II "noble" and favorable to an
unchecked arms race. 19 This is hardly a ringing endorsement from a political ally on the
product of the Carter Administration's arms negotiations. These objections and other
problems in the methodology and terms of SALT II would lead to its defeat in Congress.
The failure of SALT II was one of the defining events of the Carter presidency,
Criticism was abundant for what many considered a lack of resolve on this issue. A
March 1979 New York Times poll showed 53 percent of respondents felt the United
ISU.S. President, Public Papers, 1977, I: 123.
16U.S. President, Public Papers. 1977, 107-08.
17Ibid., 10.
'8Timothy Maga, The World of Jimmv Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy, 1977-1981
(West Haven, CT: University of New Haven Press, 1994), 140.
19Ibid., 138.
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States was "weaker" than 10 years before. 1o In the same month and publication another
poll listed a 30 percent approval rating for the president's foreigTI policy as a whole. 21
1.M. Destler of The New York Times argued the president bowed to public pressure in
this issue, dooming the chances of a treaty being formed. In the face of this plummeting
public opinion, the Carter administration accused the Soviets of violating detente with
their aggressive activities in Africa. Zbignew Brzezinkski, the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs, told the U.S.S.R. to "choose either cooperation or
confrontation. "22 Destler felt this ultimatum poisoned the negotiations with the Soviets.
He argued the president showed weakness for bowing to domestic pressure and weakened
western confidence in the direction of United States' foreign policy. The criticism of
lack of direction in the decisions of Carter is common among analysts during and after
his term of office.
The Carter administration's nuclear doctrine encountered more problems with its
handling of the proposed deployment of the neutron bomb. This weapon's function was
to kill enemy troops through a release of radiation while inflicting much less damage on
surrounding structures such as buildings and military equipment. Many defense analysts
believed this weapon could be useful in deterring Soviet aggression through conventional
forces in Europe. The Carter administration also spoke optimistically about the use of
this weapon as an incentive to encourage the Soviet Union to engage in arms reduction
talks that would benefit the United StateS.23 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown hinted
the neutron weapon could be "shelved" in exchange for the Soviet Union limiting the
production of its SS-20 nuclear missiles. 24 The Soviet Union did not respond to Brown's
overture. The Soviets only promised to not build a neutron weapon if the United States
2tNew York Times, 4 March 1979,4.
2JNew York Times, 2 March 1979, 1.
22I.M. Destler, "Treaty Troubles: Versailles in Reverse," Foreign Policy 33
(Winter 1978-79): 56.
23New York Times, 10 March 1978, 4.
24Ibid., 14 March 1978, 4.
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did the same. AJthough Carter rejected this proposal in 1978. he remained convinced that
this weapon was necessary for the defense of Europe.
In the winter of 1978, Carter's support for the production of this weapon came
under attack from his own advisors while he defended its usefuJness. Carter's Anns
Control and Disannament Agency released a report in February concluding the
deployment of a neutron weapon would increase the chances for a nuclear war. The
report also listed doubts as to the weapon's usefulness in arms negotiations with the
U.S.S.R. The agency argued that the production of this weapon was contrary to Carter's
policies of mutual restraint by the superpowers in nuclear arms production.l~ The
contradictory statements by Carter and the AnTIs Control Agency would lead to a
stunning reversal in administration policy on the neutron bomh.
In April, administration officials stated that the president planned to delay
production of the neutron bomb indefinitely. Publicly administration officials stated the
delay would ease United States relations with West Germany. a country that opposed the
program, and encourage the Soviet Union to exercise restraint in its recent aggression in
Third World areas. Privately, they conceded they held little realistic hope that the
cancellation of production of the neutron bomb would curb Soviet aggression in Angola
and Ethiopia. 26
Carter's decision not to produce the neutron bomb drew harsh criticism from a
variety of sources. Members of his own party, such as Senators Henry Jackson and Sam
Nunn opposed the decision. Jackson stated he was considering congressional action to
override Carter's decision by passing legislation allotting the necessary funds to the
weapon, forcing its production. Richard Burt, editorial columnist for the New York
Times, stated that this decision has raised doubts in Europe "over Mr. Carter's
25New York Times, I February 1978,5.
26fbid.,4 April 1978, 3.
-
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decisiveness and willingness to take the lead on difficult defense matters.,,27 Burt
reponed that NATO officials who did not wish to be named stated the organization's
European members were near a position of uni fied support for the deployment of the
weapon when Carter began to backslide on his commitment. Burt argued that the most
concerning aspect of the neutron bomb issue was that the president opened negotiations
with the allies without first solidifYing his position on the weapon. 2R Burt's article was an
editorial piece on his opinions of the Carter Administration, and must be understood as
the beliefs of one individual. The fact Jackson and Nunnjoined Burt in this criticism of
Carter make his personal opinions more significant. These combined statements give
evidence to a growing perception Carter lacked a decisive direction in his nuclear
doctrine.
By J979, widespread fear arose that the Soviet Union had gained "escalation
dominance" in Europe and calls for action to restore a balance in this region arose.
Abandoning the intentions of SALT II, the Carter administration conceded to the fears of
the National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in December of 1979. Carter ordered
the deployment of 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II nuclear missiles. 29 In 1980,
the nuclear defense budget increased by $47.6 billion compared to the previoius year.
This was the largest increase in nuclear defense in American history to date. Carter's
1979 defense budget proposal of$126 billion was the largest in history. From 1978 to
1980, Carter's proposals for defense spending increased 3% each year. 30 The
administration hoped that this spending and deployment of additional nuclear weapons
would lead to beneficial arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. Conservatives and
military analysts such as Richard Pipes and Senator Jake Gam,who believed the best way
27fbid., 1 April 1978, 5.
28Tbid., 1 April 1978,5.
29David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the AnTIS Race (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1983), 70.
3oo.S. President, Public Papers, 1: 187.
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to negotiate with the Soviets was [rom a position of strength, favored this action. This
announced deployment was seen as a movement to a stronger negotiating position. The
Soviet Union contended the 1979 NATO proposal was an American attempt to regain its
nuclear dominance over them before entering into arms negotiations. The NATO decree
had significant influence over the negotiation posture of the Soviet Union. In reaction to
the prospect of a NATO nuclear buildup, Soviet Prime Minister Leonid Brezhnev offered
to reduce his nation's medium range delivery systems if the 1979 plan was aborted.3 ! The
Caner administration preferred negotiation to buildup as a remedy for the threat of
nuclear war. However, Carter turned to nuclear deployment late in his term after
negotiations based on the current nuclear balances had failed, producing modest success.
Another fundamental element of Carter's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union
was a focus on human rights. His administration openly communicated with Soviet
dissidents and encouraged civil rights campaigns within the Soviet Union. He was highly
critical of human rights violations by communist nations. 32 Many European and
American observers questioned whether Carter's human rights policy was diminishing
the sense of detente between the two nations. In the interest of SALT II negotiations,
Carter put aside his human rights critique of the Soviet Union. This shows a lack of
resolve in the fundamental goals of the administration.
Several disturbing international incidents occurred under the Carter administration
fueled doubts about the president's foreign policy leadership. On September 26, 1978, the
House of Representatives discussed the problems in United States' foreign policy and
their relation to the efforts of the Soviet Union. Several witnesses testified to a sense of
heightened tension between the two nations at the closing of the decade. At this session,
Chester A. Crocker, the Associate Director of the International Relations Department at
Georgetown University, called Carter's policies instinctive and reflexive reactions to the
3IIbid.,73.
J2Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Detente, 203.
-
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Soviet Union. He argued that United States' foreign policy had been on a decline since
the Nixon adrninistration.J3 The hearings pointed to events such as the Soviet airlift of
Cuban troops in Ethiopia and the communist government there. Similar Soviet activities
in Somalia placed considerable pressure on the president to take a harder foreign policy
stance. Mr. Crocker favored engaging in the practice of what he called "linkage,"
informing the Soviets their aggression in Africa would threaten the SALT l] negotiations.
However, he expressed "serious reservations" about the Administration's resolve in
engaging in this practice at the expense of arms negotiations.34 These discussions
demostrated that Congress began to doubt Carter's ability to produce fruitful agreements
with the Soviets.
President Carter believed the Cold War had been equally frustrating and tiring for
both sides. With this belief in mind, he took a curious attitude toward the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979. He believed this action would be unsuccessful and show Soviet
leaders the perils of this sort ofimperiahsm and create dissent among its public. He
believed the frustrations in the Afghanistan invasion would encourage the Soviets to
abandon their aggression as the United States did following its actions in Vietnam and
engage in a period of "peaceful coexistence. »35 Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
argued that the United States should renounce what he called "American Imperialism."
Carter felt this action would warm third world nations to the United States and put further
pressure on the Soviets to change their policies toward developing nations. As the
Soviets showed increased commitment in Afghanistan, Carter changed his tone stating
events there caused a "dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviet Union's
ultimate goals are... "36 Fears arose in the administration that actions in Afghanistan were
33Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East, United States-Soviet Relations, 1978, 95th Congr., 2nd
session, 9 Aug 19,26 September, 1978,45.
34Ibid., l] 7.
)~Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter, 143.
36Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Detente, 204.
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a prelude towards Soviet efforts to gain increased control over the oil supplies in the
Persian Gulf. In addition, the United States' poor relations with nations in the area
eliminated the chance of a regional backlash. These events again showed a lack of
resolve in the positions of this president along with an initial lack ofjudgment.
The few statements by Carter regarding Soviet activity in Africa threatening arms
negotiations were criticized at this session in Congress. Many believed Carter was being
too indecisive in their message of consequences to the Soviets. Critics also made the
point that the United States lacked the military and diplomatic footing to impede Soviet
activities in Africa. This criticism was further evidence to the foreing policy difficulties
of the administration.
On the positive side, the Carter administration improved relations with China.
This was a contrast to the deteriorating relations between the two countries under
President Ford. China began to oppose the Ford administration in ;ts foreign policy
initiatives. China supported a faction in the struggle for power in Angola that opposed
the group President Ford was supporting. J7 This deterioration of relations slowed under
Carter, as a potential alliance began to fonn between the two nations after the death of
Mao Tse Tung in 1978. Alarmed by these actions, Prime Minister Brezhnev warned that
Carter should not play the "China card," calling it a "short sighted and dangerous policy"
that the United States might come to regret. 3R Showing resolve against the warnings of
Brezhnev, the United States granted Most Favored Nation status to China. However, this
action came after the president abandoned SALT II talks. In The Soviet Union and the
Arms Race, David Holloway also points out that China spent most of its resources on
industrial, not military development after 1978, limiting its role as a threat to the Soviet
Union. 39
37Greene, John R. The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, KS: University






Evidence suggests the Soviet Union viewed the Carter administration as a worthy
target for political and diplomatic pressure. In a report by Morris Rothenburg for the
Defense Nuclear Agency, the Soviet Union entered into a public relations campaign to
disrupt and discourage two aspects of United States' policy. The first was the movement
of the United States towards a "limited nuclear options" weapons modernization program
initiated in 1974 by Secretary of Defense Kissenger. The Soviet Union also attacked the
United States' initiative to build the neutron bomb in conjunction with NATO. Citing
Carter's decision not to begin the immediate deployment of these weapons, Rothenburg's
report considered the Soviet campaign against these actions "eminently successful"
during Carter's tenn. 40
These campaigns consisted of promises of terror for the European continent and
an extensive attempt to create a wedge between the United States and West Gennany
over deployment of new weapons. The Soviet leaders believed this effort was highly
successful in undennining the Carter administration's diplomatic efforts to West
Germany and all of Europe. The Soviet newspaper lzvestiia, triumphantly reported that
the neutron bomb received a "stormy reaction in Germany" because of the United States'
"intention to make West Gennany the most probable theater for the use of this inhumane
weapon. '>41 The report stated Moscow took extreme satisfaction from the Carter
administration's hesitancy to initiate neutron bomb deployment despite the program's
favorable reception from Congress. The editors of lzvestiia concluded they stopped the
deployment by successfully undennining support for the deployment in Europe.42 The
only reason the Soviet campaigning slowed was because its leaders felt that so little was
being done in tenns of modernization after 1977. The Soviet Union viewed Carter's
4OMorris Rothenburg, Research and Analytical Evaluation of the Soviet Union
and Modernization of Nuclear Weapons Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: Advanced





\-Vithdrawal of support from the development of the neutron bomb, which they considered
a viable threat, as a significant victory. This victory fueled the Soviet Union's belief the
Carter administration had significant and exploitable diplomatic weaknesses.
In July of ]980, President Carter introduced a new nuclear weapons plan in partial
reaction to the concerns created by Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Carter's plan was
called Presidential Directive 59 and was designed to emphasize nuclear war fighting
aspects of the nation's strategy. Jt called for additional targeting of Soviet missile silos
and war making capabilities. Carter also endorsed the allotment of funds to the goal of
deploying the MX missile system that he had opposed in his first two years in office.4~
The Soviet Union labeled the directive as an attempt by the United States to regain
strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders stated the only reason for this
plan was that their forces had achieved parity in terms of nuclear capability. However, in
open Soviet literature during Carter's presidency, experts doubted the weapons called for
in Presidential Directive 59 were survivable enough to make this a credible program. 44
By survivability, Soviet planners were referring to a weapon's ability to survive a nuclear
strike and still function. Survivabihty was an important factor to Soviet stratebrists in
their evaluation of a nuclear system. In addition, Soviet publications such as SSha:
Ekonomika, politika, ideologica argued that Presidential Directive 59 was not a credible
influence on the nuclear balance because the systems involved in making the plan a
reality would not be available to until the second half of the ]980' s. 4~
Additional opposition to Carter's handling of nuclear issues arose from the crisis
at the Three Mile Jsland nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. In March of 1979, mechanical
difficulties at this plant allowed radiation to spill into the atmosphere. The plant
ownership and the federal body overseeing the plant, the Nuclear Regulatory
4JJonathan S. Lockwood, The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine:






Commission (NRC) were slow to release accurate infonnation to the public. The lack of
coherent information created fear of a massive meltdown of the reactor. Pennsylvania
Governor Richard Thornburg's call for evacuation of children and pregnant women
created additional panic. In total, 50,000 residents evacuated the areas surrounding the
plant.#> President Carter, who held training in nuclear physics, was a calming influence
on the situation. He and his wife toured the plant in the days after the accident wearing
only protective covers on their feet. However, the events at Three Mile Island created
substantial panic and negative sentiment in the nation. As panic of a massive meltdown
rose, the Catholic Diocese of Harrisburg authorized the granting of absolution in area
churchesn Over 65,000 people participated in protests against nuclear power plants in
Washington DC, the largest demonstration against nuclear power in United States'
history. California Governor Jerry Brown demanded the NSC close a nuclear plant
identical in design to Three Mile Island in his state. Jane Fonda, starring in "The China
Syndrome," a film concerning radiation leaks at a nuclear plant called for the resibrnation
of Energy Secretary James R. Schlessinger Jr. Wendell Rawls Jr. of the New York Times
stated in a May editorial that the pace of nuclear protest movements had quickened since
the accident in Pennsylvania. 4H An April 1979 New York Times/CBS Poll showed that
only 46 percent of Americans favored further development in nuclear power compared to
the 69% who supported it in July of 1977. 49 Only 20% of those polled felt the
government had been honest in their release of information to the publ ie. '0 Despite
Carter's diffusing of the situation with a visit, the Three Mile Jsland crisis created
additional resistance from the American public to his handling of nuclear issues.
In tenns of conventional forces, the Soviets took action to gain advantages over
46Staley, John and Roger Seip, Three Mile Island: A Time of Fear (Harrisburg,
PA: RFJ, Inc., 1979),22.
47Ibid.,30..
4~ew York Times, 7 May 1979, I
49Ibid., 10 Apri I 1979, 1.




the United States during the Carter presidency. A report from the Department of Defense
stated the Soviet Union had been the largest exporter of military equipment over these
years. ln connection with this supply of weapons, the study stated the Soviets had been
more aggressive in the use of military forces "to project their power and influence."11
This transportation ofanns also included the placement of twenty thousand military
advisors playing key roles in training forces in Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. These
events transpired while the Carter administration failed to construct a coherent policy to
counter this Soviet aggression. In particular, the buildup was stated as being key in
eroding NATO air SUperiOflty in Europe.52
Some of the greatest fears regarding Soviet military power in Europe centered
around conventional war. Western nations feared the Soviet Union could mount a rapid
conventional offensive through Europe, utilizing what was perceived as a Warsaw Pact
advantage in conventional forces over NATO. European nations feared the Soviets
would use their conventional forces to threaten Europe in the same manner they
influenced events in Third World regions in Africa. Pentagon officials also feared the
levels of Soviet military training for combat in a post-nuclear environment. ln addition,
the study stated the existence of a plan based on a small scale nuclear attack on NATO
nations. This nuclear attack would be followed by a conventional assault through the
breech left by the surprise strike. 53 To these conventional military threats, the Carter
administration gave no substantial answer or comparable plan for post-nuclear
conventional activities.
However, this report also argued that the anns buildup had caused a considerable
strain on the Soviet Union's economy. The emphasis on military expenditures created
food shortages, 10\\' labor productivity, and transportation disruptions. Despite these
I'Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1981 (Washington, DC:





problems, the report stated that there "are no signs of a de-emphasis of military
programs" for the future.~4 However, it did seem reasonable to assume this strain on the
economy would take a toll on the country and eventually cause a capitulation of military
production.
Other problematic trends emerged for the United States and its allies in the realm
of nuclear weapons. During administrations prior to President Carter, United States'
leaders believed the Soviet Union enjoyed numencal advantages in nuclear missiles. In
response, American officials contended that their nuclear weapons were qualitatively
superior to their Soviet counterparts and that their qualitative advantage was balanced
against Soviet numerical superiority. The 1981 Department of Defense study on the
Soviet capabilities during Carter's presidency questioned this assertion. It stated that in
past years, modernization efforts by the U.S.S.R. had dramatically reduced the United
States' lead in "virtually every important technology" involving nuclear weapons and
significantly reduced qualitative differences. 55 The study stated that the United States held
a two-to-seven year lead in microelectronics. However, the Soviet Union had 900,00
research and development scientists devoted to nuclear projects compared to the United
States' 600,000. 5(, Thus, the gap seemed to be closing at an increasing rate. Similar to
conventional weapons programs, this modernization was expected to continue despite
Soviet economic problems.
United States' defense planners also worried about Soviet research and
development in Civil Defense. In 1978, the Soviet Union employed 100,000 people in
their civil defense program. A Central Intelligence Agency report on Soviet civil defense







elements of the nation, approximately 110,000 people 57 The study estimated the Soviet
Union could accommodate up to 30% of its citizens in such shelters by 1985. As to the
effectiveness of this program, the agency stated "the Soviets almost certainly believe
their present civil defense would improve their ability to conduct military operations" and
enhance government survival after a nuclear exchange occurred. 5R Although the study
determined that the present Civil Defense capabilities in the Soviet Union would not
encourage the Soviet leaders to expose their nation to attack, these analysts believed the
program gave the Soviets increased confidence in their overall nuclear policies
The Carter administration's dealings with Iran caused a further decline in public
trust in his ability to conduct foreign policy and make sound military decisions. Despite
his stance on human rights, Carter supported the dictatorial government of the Shah in
Iran, which routinely engaged in torture of political opponents. In 1978, it became
evident that the Shah's government was in peril. United States Ambassador to Iran
William Sullivan, opened negotiations with groups opposing the Shah. In contrast, the
National Security Council (NSC) refused to open dialogue with opposition groups
gaining power in Iran. In The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., Burton Kaufman
states the contrasting statements of the NSC and Sullivan caused the Iranian military to
refuse to defend the Shah as the Ayatollah Khomeni completed a successful COUp.~9 This
is another example of the Carter administration lacking coherence and direction in its
foreign policy.
Carter showed further lack of direction in his granting of asylum to the Shah.
Carter offered and then rescinded an invitation to the Shah for entrance into the United
States. The reason for this change related to fear for the safety of the United States'
Embassy in Iran. However, Carter changed his mind when the deposed leader required
57Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Civil Defense. (Washington, DC: The
Director, 1978),2.
'SThid., 4.




treaonents for Cancer and allowed the Shah to enter the country in the fall of 1979.
Iranian militants seized the United States' Embassy in Tehran on November 4,1979,
taking 60 hostages. 60 Carter initially reacted to the situation by freezing Iranian assets
and ceased oil purchases from the country. His approval rating to the handling of the
situation initially soared to 71 % in favor of his actions. However, the administration was
unable to negotiate a release of the hostages and Carter's approval rating fell below 40
percent in April of 1980 in a Newsweek/Gallup Pole. With the urging of the National
Security council, except for Vance, Carter authorized a rescue attempt of the hostages.
Mechanical problems doomed the mission and the attempt failed miserably.61
Congressional leaders in both paTtles were critical of Carter's handling of the
rescue operation. Senators such as Henry M. Jackson of Washington were furious that
the administration did not consult Congress before acting. Democratic Congressman
Henry Reuss stated that Carter should announce he would not run for re-election in 1980
and "quietly serve out his term without any more impulsive actions.'>62 Democratic
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts called for an investigation by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee into the matter. Leaders in Congress did not blame Carter
for the mechanical problems that caused the mission to fail, but they questioned Carter's
military and diplomatic competency.
During the Carter years, his nuclear and foreign policy provoked mostly negative
reactions within government agencies. In its 1978 session on planning United States'
nuclear forces for the future, the CBO admitted the administration had made strides in
modernizing its theater nuclear forces in Europe. However, the study questioned the
ability of nuclear forces to maintain the deterrence doctrine due to the survivability
problems of United States' missiles after a first strike. The CBO also concluded
6OIbid., 159.
61Ibid, 175.




modernization of conventional forces would be necessary for the proper defen.se of
Europe 63 This study showed a need for improvements in the United States' nuclear
arsenal.
After examining United States-Soviet relations, few congressional representatives
praised President Carter's contribution to this matter. In February of 1980,
Representative Bob Michel stated the past three years demonstrated that Carter's
declarations to the Soviet Union "have no follow through, no basis in reality, no force of
law or action." He argued that Carter's stated intention to get tough with the Soviets
through a defense buildup had no "past basis to stand on" and would not curb Soviet
actions. 64 The most optimistic witnesses testified that perhaps strained relations with the
Soviet Union had "bottomed out" and mending would occur in the futUTe.6~ Others
suggested that the expectations of detente were too lofty and events during Carter's
presidency provided a dose of reality for the United States. What is certain is that the
failures of SALT II and Soviet world¥.1de aggression created a decline in relations
ben:veen the two superpowers. The best evaluations of Carter's perfonnance hinged on
hope for improvements against these setbacks in the future.
Carter's cancellation of programs developing new weapons also drew wide
criticism. In June of 1977, he announced his decision to cancel procurement of the 8-1
bomber in favor of deploying cruise missiles on the existing 8-52 bomber. Carter stated,
however, that if relations deteriorated with the Soviets "at the end of a few years it may
be necessary for me to change my mind.'>66 Francis Hoeber of the Center for Strategic
63Congressional Budget Office, Planning Nuclear Forces, 29.
I>4Congress, House, COn6JTeSSman Cheney of Wyoming speaking on the foreign
policy record of President Carter, 96th Congr., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 126,
pt. 2 (4 Feb. 1980): 1736.
65Congress, United States-Soviet Relations. 132.
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and International Studies argued this cancellation greatly weakened the United States'
position in SALT negotiations. Carter's relaxation of military buildup was commonly
criticized as an example of his weakness in foreign policy and arms negotiations.
The increases in Soviet nuclear strength raised fears the United States was
initiating a general retreat in international atlairs as relations with the Soviet Union
continued to deteriorate. Historian Dr. Jonathan Lockwood arb'Ues his] 983 study, The
Soviet View of U. S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications tor Decision Making, that United
States' init13tives had been "curbed" due to the Soviets new missile increases.67 He stated
the Carter administration's foreign policy had been impeded by its flawed nuclear
policies. Lockwood further argues Carter's human rights advocation had little impact on
superpower relations, being regarded as "hypocritical propaganda" by the Soviet Union.
Despite these problems, public opinion did not favor increased intervention by United
States' forces. Only 48% of Americans in a New York Times poll approved of sending
forces to protect Middle East oil resources in the face of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. 68 Thus, the public seemed against the restrained activities of Carter but did
not give a clear answer to what course it \vished foreign policy to take.
Members of the Carter administration argued strongly against the claim that the
United States was retreating from a leadership role in foreign policy. National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that the country was committing to broader global
engagement strategy for the future. 69 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued the notion of
an American retreat was "not only wrong as a matter of fact but dangerous as a basis for
policy.,,70 This point by Vance is a telling description of the situation at the end of the
Carter administration. The United States suffered declines in its foreign policy in areas
such as Africa during Carter's presidency. The Soviet Union gained a greater voice with
67Lockwood, The Soviet View, ]6] .
6~ew York Times, 2 March] 979,4.
69lbid., 2 May 1979, 7.




nations such as West Gennany to speak against United States' political and military
doctrines. It is, however, unclear that the decline was drastic or due to the United States'
lack of nuclear procurement during Carter's administration. Secretary of State Vance
pointed to the danger of a public belief in an American retreat in foreign policy. Vance
feared this belief could lead to a decline in domestic and international support for the
administration's defense and foreign policies. It is clear this danger existed at the close
of this administration. This is the most valid criticism of foreign policy and nuclear
doctrine under President Carter.
Secretary of Defense Brown also made some important statements about the issue
of United States' nuclear and foreign policy doctrines towards the end of his tenure. In
his annual report for the 1979 fiscal year he warned "Assured Destruction cannot be the
only response available to the President."7) He argued that the United States should have
the flexibility to respond to differing levels of Soviet aggression. Brown advised the
country to engage in a large nuclear buildup to achieve a more flexible response. This
buildup was begun during his administration, but did not achieve the level of a truly
flexible response by the time Carter left office. He argued that neither superpower had a
clear military advantage in 1979. Critics of the administration disputed thjs point.
However, Brown conceded that the growing vulnerability of land-based nuclear missile
forces, if not corrected, "could have potentially destabilizing military consequences."72
Again, the course of corrective action to this problem BroMl called for was not taken
under his leadership. Brown's statements show at the least a partial admission that the
Carter administration had placed the nation on a dangerous course to facing increased
nuclear and conventional threats to itself and its allies.
As Carter's first presidential tenn ended, additional discontent against the
71Congressional Budget Office, Planning Nuclear Forces, 21.
72Benjamm Schernrner, "New Study Shows Russia Would Hold a 70% Greater
Edge in Nuclear Exchange than is Shown in FY DOD Annual Report," Armed Forces




administration arose because of the United States' economic problems. Carter's goal of
energy conservation for the country included endorsement of unpopular gasoline
consumption legislation. This goal proved problematic as Carter continually waffled in
his public statementson whether there actually was a gas shortage in 1979 and 1980.
Administration advisor Stu Eizenstat warned the president that this wavering "gives the
impression of an absence of leadership" on a critical issue.n Discontent began to arise
concerning Carter's energy conservation policies in 1979, as oil prices continued to rise.
In addition, inflation in the country rose at alarming rates. In its evaluation of the
economic situation, the public perceived presidential ineptitude and lack of direction in
its handling of this problem. 74 These events show the perception that the Carter
administration lacked direction its leadership was not limited to nuclear and foreign
policy issues.
The actions the Carter administration took in the realms of nuclear doctrine and
strategy were considerably flawed. The Soviet Union made advances in its nuclear
arsenal during Carter's presidency. Many sources criticized Carter was for lacking the
necessary resolve on nuclear policy matters. The Soviet Union's aggressive actions in
areas such as Ethiopia and Afghanistan coupled with United States' failures in situations
such the Iran hostage crisis caused public criticism to the foreign policy of the
administration. These problem s and the resulting criticism of the administration created
the perception around the world that the United States was declining in military
readiness. These factors invariably had detrimental effects on the United States' ability
to conduct foreign policy. These realities can be seen in the Soviet belief that their
propaganda campaign against nuclear modernization prior to J979 had splintered allied
consensus on nuclear policy. Carter's 1980 campaign promises of relaxing nuclear and
diplomatic tensions with the Soviet Union caused worldwide doubts about his




competency and conviction. At the close of Carter's term, public opinion was aJigned for
a dramatic increase in conventional engagements by the United States and action to
rectify its declining strategic balance in nuclear weapons. The next decade would be




CONSERVATIVE CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND
RONALD REAGAN'S 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Discussing Soviet military strategy, Richard Pipes of the United States National
Security Council quoted Vladimir Lenin's statement that" 'peace is a breathing space for
war.'''1 Pipes, an outspoken critic of the Soviet Umon and advisor to Ronald Reagan,
was not alone in his opinions towards the Soviet Union. Many members of the United
States' military, along with politicians, authors in defense journals, and defense analysts
shared this appraisal and made up a group of conservatives on defense issues. This group
considered their rival superpower a menace to the freedom and possibly the survival of
democracy. These people did not debate on the possibility of armed conflict with the
Soviets: they accepted it as inevitable. Believing this, they feared possible Soviet nuclear
superiority over the United States. This conservative group of government officials and
defense analysts, often labeled dangerous and overly aggressive by political enemies,
contended that their country was in no position to deal with the type of coming contlict.
They believed the Soviets were preparing for a kind of warfare the Carter
Administration's strategy of deterrence was not prepared to for. This was a nuclear war
not initiated for the total destruction of the world, as envisioned by strategists in the
1960s and 1970s. Instead, many analysts believed Soviet leaders enviSIOned a conflict
with winners and losers. This group believed a massive American nuclear buildup was
needed to prepare for this eventuality.




This conservative drive for a weapons buildup was done with a sincere desire to
strengthen U.S. defenses, but there were other possible motivations for those advocating
a nuclear buildup and criticizing deterrence under Carter. It is important to note these
conservative groups stood to benefit the most from an increase in defense spending
through financial and political gain. Many of these conservative authors and politicians
held close relationships with weapons manufacturers. These weapons producers often
contributed financial support to friendly political campaigns and the publications for
whom these conservative authors wrote. The possible benefits from a nuclear buildup
included profits for arms manufacturers and gains in political favor for leaders appearing
to make the nation safe from attack. The statements of this group of conservative
politicians and analysts must be taken with these possible motivations in mind.
Conservative analysts were dissatisfied with the Carter Administration's foreign
and military policy. They were also critical of the failed rescue attempt of hostages in
Iran. These critics stated that the Carter Administration failed to weigh the odds for
success and risks of the rescue operation. Conservatives viewed the failed rescue as
evidence that the president could not uphold the nation's international image of military
strength. 2 Critics of Carter also feared the Soviet Union was expanding its areas of
influence, becoming a greater threat to the United States. Conservatives began to
publicize reports that the Soviets were influencing and supporting the governments of
Libya and Algeria. Analysts feared the goal of this action was to surround Egypt and
Saudi Arabia with communist countries, thereby shifting the balance of power in the
Middle East,3 This Soviet activity could threaten the United States' oil supply.
Conservatives criticized the president for not taking action in Africa to counteract this
trend. These foreign policy shortcomings led to criticism ofother military and defense
2Alexander Scott, "The Lessons of the Iranian Raid for American Military
Policy,"Anned Forces Journal, 117 (June 1980), 26.
3Arabel G. Kossow, "Soviet and Radical Arab Designs on the Saharan Belt,"
Anned Forces Journal, 117 (June 1980), 22.
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issues during Carter's presidency.
Opponents of deterrence were critical of some the assumptions made by this
strategy. Captain Carl Krehbiel, author for Royal United Services Institute for Defense
Studies and officer in the United States Air Force, considered hostile confrontation to be
a more likely description of superpower relations. Krehbiel did not accept the idea of
cooperation or detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.~ John Jenson
was also critical of the ideas behind deterrence. He did not believe it was wise for the
U.S. to have an inferior nulcear force compared to its chief adversary,
that was only intended to convince the Soviets nuclear war was not profitable. l These
men considered the idea of keeping a lesser force compared to a country they considered
a rival defeatist in nature. They worried about how military planners could possibly
know what specifications a force seeking the goal of deterrence required. Conservatives
argued deterrence was an inadequate form of defense because it left the United States in
an inferior and possibly vulnerable position to the Soviet Union.
ConservatIve authors also attacked the arms reduction treaties proposed under
President Carter, such as SALT II. Many critics of SALT alleged that the Soviets
enjoyed a huge advantage in nuclear arms at the time of these agreements. They also felt
the treaties would limit the "survivability" of United States and NATO nuclear weapons.
SALT II placed limits on the ability of both countries to move their mobile nuclear anns
to different areas. This ability to move weapons added to the chance they would avoid
destruction in attack, enhancing their survivability. American critics of SALT II pointed
out that its proposed restriction on mobility increased the advantage held by Soviet
missiles, which were stored in hardened silos; this type of storage facility was more
4Carl Krehbiel, "Military Asymmetries in the Soviet-American Strategic
Balance," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, ]25 (June
1980), 24.
5John W. Jenson, "Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American
Thinking," Air University Review, 30, (March/April 1979), 4.
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resistant to a nuclear strike, an advantage most United States' sites lacked at that time.
Opponents claimed these agreements failed to achieve a balance in the armaments of the
two nations. While complying with SALT, analysts feared the Soviets could enjoy a
three to one ratlo of nuclear weapons. Micheal May, Associate Director of the La\Vfence
Livermore Laboratory, opposed these agreements because in reducing United States'
nuclear weapons, they increased Soviet advantages.6 This was due to Soviet quantitative
advantages prior to the treaties. May's objectivity is questionionable because of his
employment in the defense industry. Paul Nitze, in his article in Foreign Policy, stated
that the agreements have no "discernible effect in arresting the trend toward an
increasingly large margin of Soviet superiority."7 He argued that bui ldup of mil itary
strength, not treaties, were the only hope in making detente a reality.& Nitze was an
example of an outspoken critic of deterrence and strong conservative on nuclear defense
issues. Carter passed Nitze over for the position of U.S. chief arms negotiator in 1976,
fearing his views would poison the chance for beneficial agreements with the Soviets.
Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinburger also citicized him for holding overly
aggressive on nuclear issues.9 These facts place the value ofNitze's conclusions into
question. These critics felt American representatives to the negotiations were ignorant of
this reality in their dealings with the Soviet Union. This lack of competency and the
limitations of the SALT agreements heightened conservative fears of the possibilities ofa
nuclear conflict for which the United States was not prepared. Conservative military and
political analysts found the nuclear policies of President Carter quite dissatisfying.
Despite their possible biases, May and Nitze are two examples of a considerable group of
6Micheal May, "Nuclear Weapons: Address, March 10, 1978," Vital Speeches of
the Day, 44 (June 1978),486-87.
?Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Pol icy, 25 (Winter, 1976-77),
202-3.
8lbid., 195.
9Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate
in Nuclear Arms Control) New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984),53.
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conservative critics to deterrence and the Carter Administrations nuclear doctnne.
The political makeup conservative analysts associated \vith the Soviet Union led
them to believe an offensive nuclear strike was not out of the question. John Jenson
stated that the Soviets believed their system of socialism was superior to western
capitalism and would eventually triumph. Conservatives such as Jenson felt this belief
encouraged the Soviets to take aggressive action against the western world. Others
worried that the communist system placed few political restraints on the Soviet leaders.
Unlike a democratic government, no electoral bindings existed on Soviet leaders to check
their military actions. 10 Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan called socialism a
""religion'" and stated belief in it required its followers to attempt to create a one-world
Communist state. Krehbiel argued that from childhood, Soviet children were "reared on
an ideology of conflict from international class struggle to the battle against international
imperialism. "11
Analysts made other assumptions about the international goals of the Soviets.
Leading analysts, who studied the Soviet Union's leaders, were not satisfied with the
current '"world order" and might attempt to change it through aggression. 12 Young Soviet
leaders had not experienced the horrors of World War II. Those in the United States
military felt this fact would make communist leaders more aggressive. Edgar Ulsamer,
analyst of the Soviet Union for Air Force Magazine, felt a greater danger existed because
"for the first time in Soviet history, the USSR and its allies will be militarily superior to
the rest of the world."J) Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense under Reagan, agreed
that the Soviets held imperialistic Soviet goals. He stated it was the responsibility of the
United States to "bring a halt to the further expansion and consolidation ofthe Soviet
IOSee Jenson, "Nuclear Strategy," 54; and Krehbiel, "Military Asymmetries," 25.
'IKrehbiel, "Military Asymmetries," 25.
12Dimitri Simes, "Disciplining Soviet Power," Foreign Policy, 43 (Summer,
1981),41.




Empire."14 Conservatives used the assumed political and international policies of the
Soviets to substantiate their belief in the strong possibility of a coming nuclear conflIct.
It is important to note the objectiVIty and lack of eVIdence to support of conservative
appraIsals of the beliefs and mtentlOns of the SovIet Union. None of these analysts had
access to venfIable infonnation on the exact beliefs of SovIet leaders. the beliefs of
citizens, or what was bemg taught to children.
In relation to nuclear anns, analysts made some disturbing conclusions about the
Soviets. Jenson believed there was no reason, considering the history and political
ideology of the Soviets, to believe they would ever accept a position of nuclear inferiority
to the United States. This belief caused some to question whether the United States
should trust the Soviet Union to adhere to arms reduction treaties. IS Even if the parity
and congruence did exist between the superpowers, conservatives believed that it would
not discourage the Soviets from acting in an aggressive fashion. Due to the horrors of
World War U in the Soviet Union, many felt they had an entirely different belief towards
"acceptable losses" in war. Pipes bel ieved the Soviets considered defensive strategies in
a nuclear war as important as offensive tactics. Pipes argued that the Soviets felt
preparations prior to a nuclear war could lead to possible victory. 16 The Soviets might
initiate a nuclear war because it was the best political option available to them at the time.
Philip Peterson made the chilling conclusion that if the Soviets concluded war was
inevitable, "their long standing recognition of the importance of surprise wi.ll
undoubtedly prompt them to strike first."17 These conclusions fueled arguments for
immediate action to upgrade the nuclear capabilities of the United States in order to
prepare for Soviet aggression.
J4Keith Shimko, Images and Anns Control, (Ann Arbor, Ml: University of
Michigan Press, 1992), 66.
15See Jenson, "Nuclear Strategy," 17; and Shimko, Images, 115.
JOSee Jenson, "Nuclear Strategy," 5; and Pipes, "Soviet Doctrine," 56-57
"Phillip Peterson, "Flexibility: A Driving Force in Soviet Strategy," Air Force
Magazine, 63 (March 1980), 98.
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In additIOn to fears of the ideology of the Soviets, many people cited tremendous
differences in weapons spending by the two superpowers. In the 1970's, Ulsamer
pOinted to a CIA study claiming the Soviet Union outspent the United States by 30
percent. IR Senator Jake Gam, a staunch conservative on defense issues and critic of
Carter, cited a 1980 CIA study stating the Soviets were outspending the United States by
50 percent and held a 2.6 to I advantage in strategic forces advantage. He also claimed
Soviet nuclear expenditures were nearly 50 percent of their entire strategic budget; this
compared to 15 percent for the United States. 19 General David Jones, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1980 of the
consequences of current patterns continuing; he stated the Soviets would have a certain
statistical advantage in every nuclear anns category by the early part of the decade. 20 In
]983, a study by the Congressional Budget Office estimated the Soviets quadrupled their
offensive nuclear forces in the past ten years. 21 This imbalance and America's predicted
arms deficit, coupled with their supposed political agenda, was a cause of serious concern
for citizens who placed a high value on military strength. This position of inferiority
caused some Americans to believe an arms buildup was necessary for ensuring the safety
of the country.
Conservatives claimed that Soviet civil defense was making progress towards
negating the problem of radiation fallout after a nuclear conflict. As early as 1960,
United States analysts believed the necessary technology existed to construct facilities
capable of reducing the etfects of radiation. James H. Douglas, Secretary of Defense in
1960, stated in a White House study that shelters stocked with adequate provisions could
18Ulsamer, "Moscow's Goal," 45.
19Jake Gam, "Exploitable Strategic Nuclear Superiority," International Security
Review, 5 (Summer, 1980), 173.
20See Ulsamer, "Moscow's Goal," 46; and Gam, "Exploitable Superiority," 174.
21The Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces:
The Administration's Program and Alternatives, report prepared by Alice M. Rivlin,




slgmficantly reduce casualties from nuclear explosions. 22 Secondary literature suggests
President Carter took unprecedented actlOn In cIvIl defense preparation. In LIfe Under a
Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom, Allan Wmkler wrote that civil defense was
valued by the Carter Administration. Winkler points to Carter's creation of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as evidence of his argument that civil defense
was important to this president. 23 Despite the creation of FEMA, conservative analysts
such as Krehbiel and Peterson believed the Soviet Union led the United States in civil
defense preparation through the 1970s. This belief concerning civil defense led to
observers identifying radiation control as another area in which the Soviets held an
advantage during Carter's presidency.
Proponents of a change In nuclear planning pointed to history for examples of
past mistakes by nations and the possibility of their recurrence. They stated current
actions by the United States were similar to the mistakes made by the Allied powers in
the 1930's. They used such terms as" 'd'eja' vu" when comparing deterrence with the
failed policy of appeasement used in Europe towards Hitler. Conservative analysts
feared treatIes and defensive, damage control strategies used in respect to the Soviet
Union would lead to similar results24 Unlike during World War II, the United States
dealt with an enemy possessing nuclear weapons, Allied powers were able to recover
from early strategic mistakes in the 1940' s. A nuclear war would not be as forgivi ng to
early errors, creating another argument for a stronger United States defense force.
Some observers believed the United States faced changes in the technology of
nuclear weapons. Major Roger Lewis worried that the increased accuracy of nuclear
weapons in the 1980's compared to two decades earlier created a problem. This new
220ffice of Civil and Defense Mobilization, White House Conference on Fallout
Protection (January 1960), by Leo A. Hoegh, 11-14.
23Winkler, Allan, Life Under a Cloud: Anxiety About the Atom, (New York:





accuracy had a negative efTect on deterrence strategy because of the ability of these new
missiles to threaten United States nuclear submannes and bombers. 25 Lewis \\lTote for
Joint Perspectives, a conservative military magazine that published many articles by
military officers calling for a nuclear buildup. Senator Gam stated hIs fear that the long
amounts of time a 8-52 required to takeoff and become safe from a nuclear blast was an
example of vulnerability. The 13-52 had been in servIce since the 1950' s and was
outdated in the opinion of many military otlicials, especially if being used for a nuclear
strike. These analysts feared the accuracy of new nuclear weapons and anti-aircraft
defenses, coupled with the slow take otT or escape time of the 8-52 made this aircraft
extremely vulnerable in the 1980's. Even Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense in the
Carter administration and proponent of deterrence, admitted to U.S. vulnerability in this
area. Brown predicted in 1980 that during that decade, the Soviet Union would gain the
abdity to destroy United States 13-52 bombers and nuclear submarines through technical
advances. Brown's statements give val idity to Lewis and Gam's criticism, wich
othenvise could be considered agenda-based arguments for a defense bUIldup. Nuclear
bombers and submarines played a vital role in the overall arsenal of the United States 2(,
Senator Gam quoted Brown's further prediction that increased accuracy gave the Soviets
the ability to destroy missiles on the ground in their silos, or holding areas. Before thIS
innovation in technology, destroying missiles in silos was a more difficult task to
accomplish. In the 1980s, more accurate missiles gave the Soviets the ability to do this
with a small fraction of their forces."7
Some politicians worried the United States was not makIng efforts to upgrade its
nuclear weapons under President Carter. Micheal May claimed that the country had
25Major Roger D. Lewis, 'The Evolution of US Nuclear Doctrine and the Need
for a Countervailing Strategy," Joint Perspectives, 2 (Nov, 19~2), 35.
26Harold Brown, "US Strategic Nuclear Policy," Air Force Policy Letter for
Commanders, Sup. (Oct. 1980), 2.





spent some funds on improving the survivability of its nuclear weapons, but admitted no
effort existed to improve the efficiency of these weapons. His belief was while the
Soviets upgraded their weapons in areas such as efliciency, the United States only
attempted to increase survivability. 2& Others questioned this stratebry because no
hardened Installation could withstand repeated nuclear assault by nuclear weapons. 29 Air
Force Lieutenant Andrew Andrews, research and development coordinator for the
Defense Nuclear Agency, took criticism of his country's lack of flexibility a step farther
by claiming that it had no organized tactical doctrine for nuclear defense or established
method of deploying its arsenal in the event of a war.30 Andrews wrote for another
journal, Military ReView, that was known for its conservative stance on defense and
criticism of Carter's poliCies in this area. The fact Andrews' critical analysis of the
nation's defense current defense strategy was published a month prior to the 1980
PreSidential electIOn should be conSidered when evaluating its obJectiVity. This Increase
In SovIet technology still gave further eVidence to support the contentIon that the Umted
States was not nearly as prepared for a nuclear conflict compared to their chief
adversary and was vulnerable.
Conservatives argued that the greatest failure of deterrence was its lack of impact
on the Soviet Umon's military and foreign policies. Lewis stated that under this strategy
the realities of the Umted State's strategic capabilities were not nearly as Important as "is
our enemy's perceptIOn ofthose realities that countS."31 Nitze echoed these sentiments In
arguing the capacity of United States' annarnents needed to deter nuclear war must be
measured against how much of an advantage the Soviets believed they needed for
victory. In his opinion, a nuclear war could be initiated and won under certain
2~May, "Nuclear Weapons," 487.
2'>Leslie 1. Hamblin, "Deterrence: After the Golden Age." Air University Review,
33 (Jan./Feb. 1982): 30.
30Andrew Andrews, "Toward a Tactical Nuclear Doctrine." Military Review,
60 (Oct. 1980), 18.





conditions.32 Krehbiel stated the Soviet Union agreed with Nitze's analysis and
calculated, -'the side with superior offensive weapons, defensive preparations, and
strategy could achieve a favorable outcome in war."}} Little doubt existed, even among
advocates of deterrence, that the Soviet Union held strategic advantages in all of these
categories. Conservatives believed current United States' defenses did little to
discourage Soviet military aggression. To Nitze and Krehbiel, deterrence failed because
politicians in the United States lacked a fundamental understanding of the Soviet Union.
Conservatives felt leaders in the western world did not understand that the defense they
perceived as adequate in preventing a nuclear war fell short of convincing the very nation
it sought to deter. The conclusion was that lack of nuclear abilities could cause the
United States to be subject to "polItical bully1Og" by the Soviet Union in foreign policy
Issues. This possibility angered and frightened conservatives accustomed to a dommant
position in world affairs.'·
As Carter's presidency progressed, military analysts began to conclude that the
Soviets were planning for nuclear aggression. Nitze wrote that nuclear war would not be
instigated as mutual suicide. Instead, he believed it would be an action engaged in to
pursue military or political goals. Krehbiel concluded the Soviets were studyIng a "cold
launch techmque." ThiS was a method of launching a nuclear mIssile with relatively few
start up procedures; mak10g a miSSile launch more difficult to predict and detect. ThiS
would add an element of surprise to nuclear warfare35 Using limited amounts of
information coming out of the Soviet Union, Pipes deduced their leaders showed interest
10 the impact of a surprise "first strike" against the United States. These analysts felt that
their greatest tears were com1Og true; the strong POSSIbility of a nuclear contllct 10 a time
32Nitze, "Deterring our Deterrent," 198.
33Krehbiel, "Military Asymmetries," 27.
34May, "Nuclear Weapons," 486.




of United States' vulnerability.
Nitze stated some specific requirements for any side emerging with favorable
results from a nuclear war. The side attempting to win a conflict would need to have a
powerful "counterforce capability." This tenn referred to the amount of weapons the side
attacking first would have after its opponent replied with a wave of missiles. Nitze
believed that in order to achieve eventual victory, the aggressor needed a clear
strategic advantage after the first exchange of missiles. Also, the aggressor must
protect the majority of its weapons in hardened positions, effectively insulated from a
nuclear blast. Lastly, the aggressor nation needed to have a capable conventional mi Iitary
force to survive the first exchange of missiles.36 Nitze and other analysts felt that the
Soviet Union possessed these three requirements. The Soviet bui Idup of weapons during
the 1970s convinced many people that the counterforce requirement was a reality.
One type of conflict, often called a "limited nuclear war" between superpowers
did not favor the United States according to many military analysts. This was a conflict
in which the two superpowers would not exchange all of their forces simultaneously;
instead one side might strike first with a smaller number of weapons. One problem the
United States would face in this scenario was its amount of "throw weight," or the
amount of nuclear tonnage available to it.l? in the early 1980s, United States' nuclear
planners conceded these throw weight disadvantages. Military analysts argued that the
United States' weapons were of superior accuracy and technology, making tonnage
differences less important. The problem with this belief lay in the conditions of a limited
nuclear conflict. Many feared the Soviets would strike first, with perhaps a third of its
nuclear forces. Due to throw w~ight advantage, the Soviets could conceivably not use
any of their nuclear submarines and bombers in this strike.
Jfthis were to occur, the United States president would be forced to choose one of
36Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," 197-198.
37Krehbiel, "Military Asymmetries," 30.
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two unfavorable options. He could retaliate with a strike of sImilar strength. ThIs action
would have serious consequences. After the deployment of these weapons and the
impact of the Soviet wave, the United States would have very few nuclear warheads In
reserve. In comparison, their adversaries would have a large portion of their forces still
available due to perceived advantages in hardened silos and civil defense. SovIet
bombers and submarines could also be moved away from nuclear impact points and made
available to be held in reserve. The second option would be not to retaliate to the Soviet
surprise attack with a large number of weapons. This strategy would run the risk of
nuclear missiles being destroyed in then launching areas by the Incoming strike. This
second reaction to a Soviet first strike would leave the United States with a strategic
disadvantage due to origInal throw weIght problems. Even worse, this action would
result in a ravaged United States' landscape with huge casualties from the strike, and
little damage done to the Soviet Union.3&
After either course of action, analysts predicted a Soviet victory, partial
destruction of the United States, and global political upheaval. Representative Robin
Beard of Tennessee released a study stating that after a "surprise attack" by the Soviet
Umon and a reply by the United States, a 70 percent nuclear warhead advantage would be
held by the Soviets. 39 In addition, Nitze claimed Soviet civil defense was capable of
saving up to 90 percent of its population from a nuclear strike. If correct, the Soviet
Union would be easily capable of fielding a conventional army. After tbis limited form
of nuclear war, the Soviet Union would stand as the unchallenged power in terms of
nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and population. This force could then intimidate
the United States and the rest of the world into acceptmg any terms of surrender the
Soviets decided upon. 40 The possibi lity of these horrible events led Reagan and other
38See Krehbiel, "Military Asymmetries," 29; and Nitze, "Deterring Our
Deterrent," 207.
39Schemmer, "New Study Shows Russia," 5.




conservative leaders to call for a bui Idup in the nation's nuclear forces.
Conservative fears concerning the Soviet Union's preparations for a limited
nuclear war are supported in the lImited amount of secondary literature concerning Soviet
military thought on nuclear war in the late 1970's. In Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91,
fonner Secretary of the Soviet Defense Council and Deputy Mmister of Defense Andrei
A. Kokoshin argued that the Soviet Union was preparing for conventional troop activities
in a post-nuclear environment. He stated that Soviet strategic and operational concepts
included the theory of "deep operations" into enemy territory after a nuclear strike. Soviet
Anny General Pavlosky believed the combination of increased developments of nuclear
weapons combined with enhanced training of ground forces made this strategy feasible."1
This line of strategy can also be seen in the writings of Lieutenant GeneraJl.l.
Yurpol' sky and his belief in the "three-dimensional battle." In the 1970's he was
developing offensive tactics involving the transportation of ground forces over radiation
contaminated areas for deep offensive activity after a nuclear strike.42 Kokoshin argues
that as late as the end of the 1970' s, Soviet military professionals believed in the
"principle of strategy's subordination to policy" despite the realities of the nuclear age. 43
Kokoshin argues that Soviet military planners considered nuclear war an element of
political policy, not necessarily the total destruction of civilization. This type of strategic
thinking is similar to American conservatives invisionment of a limited nuclear war.
As a presidential candidate in 1976 and 1980 Ronald Reagan made an issue of
conservative's fears on the nation's nuclear defense. Similar to Jimmy Carter's 1976
campaign, Reagan was critical of President Ford's nuclear defense and foreign pol icy
record. Reagan stated that ford "lacked a coherent world view," and argued the Soviet
4JKokoshin, Adrei, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91 (Cambridge, MA: The





Union had achieved nuclear superiority over the Umted States in ]976. 44 In agreement
with conservative defense analysts, Reagan argued that the United States should be able
to negotiate arms reduction treaties from a position of strength over the Soviet Union.
Reagan joined Carter in attacking Ford's willingness to negotiate arms treaties with the
Soviets while they conducted aggression in such areas as Angola. Reagan blasted Ford
and Secretary of State Henry Kissenger, stating they "must be made accountable to
history" for allowing the United States to slip behind the Soviet Union In military power
Although his] 976 campaign was unsuccessful, Reagan presented himself as a
sympathetic figure to the concerns of conservatives on the issue of nuclear defense.
Reagan's use of this issue continued in his 1980 campaign. He warned
Americans that in the event of nuclear war, "the Russians could just take us with a phone
call. "45 This type of rhetoric was common through the political career of Ronald Reagan.
He employed with considerable frequency harsh statements in respect to the issue of
nuclear war. The general public was concerned about the subject of nuclear war during
this period. Nuclear related issues were key in forming public opinion and deciding
many elections. Reagan's political success and popularity fluctuated during his years of
office holding and seeking. In speeches and statements, Reagan used the issue of nuclear
war as a means of attaming political goals. He frequently used this sore spot in the
American public's mind as a club to beat groups dissenting from his policies. Reagan
used nuclear war as a scare tactic to garner support for controversial administration
programs and attack his political enemies.
Beginning in 1976, several conservative advisors supported and influenced
Reagan. One group was known as "Team B." This group was made up of advisors to
then CIA Director George W.H. Bush. Team B \vas essential in forming the Reagan
claim in the 1980 presidential campaign that the Soviets held nuclear superiority over the
«New York Times, 2 February 1976, 15.
4sRobert Scheer, With Enough Shovels (Ne\\ \(ork: Random House, ]982), 66
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United States. Historians and writers accuse Bush and Team R members of manipulating
CIA data to conform to their personal political ideology. The CIA data that Bush and his
advisors compiled led to increased statements on the nuclear vulnerability of the United
States to the Soviet Union.46 As Reagan announced his decision to run for president,
another key advisory group formed. During the 1980 presidential campaign, the
Committee on the Present Danger, made up of former members of Team B, re-evaluated
the United States' assessment of the Soviet Union. Committee members criticized the
SALT treaties and the moderate views some individuals had of the Soviet Union.~7
Thirty-three members of this committee became members of the first Reagan
administration. 48 Reagan also hired Harvard historian Richard Pipes to serve on his
National Security Council Staff. Pipes was well-known for his cntical opinions and
statements about the Soviet Union. An example of Pipes' views was a speech in 1981 in
which he stated, "Soviet leaders would have to choose between peacefully changing their
communist system.O'or gomg to war."49 Reagan's use of these advisors and staff
members by Reagan in his political campaign demonstrated hlS intent on to make nuclear
defense a main focus in his presidency.
As the election of 1980 neared, President Carter faced two publicity problems.
Both dealt with issues of foreign policy and the strength of the United States. First, the
American public worried over its president's lack ofcontrol over international afTairs,
such as the Iranian hostage crisis. Second, the perception existed that the Soviet Union
held a strategic advantage over the United States.~o A call began for movement to remedy
this weakness in respect to America's greatest rival. In January of 1980,49 percent of
46Sheer, Shovels, 53-54.
47Ibid., 36-39.
4'1Ielga Haftendom and Jakob Schissler, eds., The Reagan Administration: A
Reconstruction of American Strength? (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 94.
49Scheer, Shovles, 6-8.
~oElizabeth Drew, Portrait of an Election: The 1980 Presidential Campaign (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), 108-] 16.
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the general public favored of mcreasing defense spending. 51
Reagan noted that conservative military analysts held serious reservations about
Carter's reliance on deterrence and MAD. At the Republican National Convention,
where Reagan won his party's nomination, his and the party's attack on Carter's defense
initiatives became a part of the party platform and key to the rest of the campaign. The
Republican platform rejected Carter's theory of MAD "which limits the President to a
Hobson's choice between mutual suicide and surrender."52 The platform also called for
Immediate work towards a superior nuclear technology. 5"\ As election day neared, the
attack on Cater's policies increased. After recieving the nommation of his party, Reagan
became more aggressive on the shortcomings of Carter's defense policies. His argument
against MAD centered around his belief that this policy would lead America to a position
of total inferiority and inability to deal with the Soviet Union. He called the policy one of
"weakness, inconsistency, vacillation, and bluff." In addition, he accused his opponent of
being "totally oblivious" to the military and political designs of the Soviets. 54 The attacks
on Carter became more personal and venomous as the election day neared. Following
this pattern of attack on MAD, Reagan staff member Kenneth Adams stated "How ironic
it is that liberals, who pride themselves on their mora] motives, advocate such a blood
curdling approach, namely that all is well as long as we can launch enough missiles to
kill a hundred million or so Soviets." In an even more aggressive attack, Reagan
insinuated the Soviets might directly aid Carter in an effort to continue their gains in
increased nuclear superiority over the United States. Reagan referred to an "October
Surprise" in which "the Soviet Union is going to throw a few bones to Mr. Carter during
"Bruce Russett and Donald Deluca, "Don't Tread on Me: Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy In the Eighties," Political Science Quarterly 96 (Fa11 1981): 397.
52Ibid., 326.
53Lou Cannon, President Reagan: A Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1991), 320.





thIs coming campaign in order to help him continue as PTesident."~~ Reagan made this
statement with no factual basis to substantiate it. It is an example of a statement made for
the sole purpose of demeaning his opponent over this issue.
In the final month of the campaign, Reagan backed down from his outcry against
the U.S. nuclear defense policy. His emphasis on defense began to backfire as seen in his
declining public opinion ratings. Advisors feared the public would view Reagan as a
"war monger" causing hIS approval to suffer.~6 In reaction to his opponent's falling
approval rating on the issue, Carter described his opponent's stance on relations with the
Soviet Union as "dangerous" and "disturbing."~7 The media also began to attack
Reagan's aggressive beliefs on defense. Hedrick Smith, ChiefWashinbrton
Correspondent for the New York Times, stated "Even allowing for the exaggerated
hyperbole of a political campaign," Reagan's statements "have continually rung with
alarrn."5R Smith called Reagan's statements on the future of the Cold War and the fate of
the West "apocalyptic."59 Reagan responded to these charges by agreeing to re-open
discussions on the SALT treaties after his election. Reagan had initially criticized the
SALT agreements as detrimental to American defense and promised not to pursue it upon
his election. After Reagan took this relaxed stance towards defense, polls indicated
public opinion against him began to shrink.60 This backsliding by Reagan demonstrated
his position on nuclear defense was not static. Instead, it is obvious that nuclear defense
was a political tool to be manipulated however the situation dictated in his quest for
office.
Carter attempted to commit considerable rescources to both nuclear and general
defense. The second greatest increase in United States' history had been a $47.6 billion
55 See Cannon, President Reagan, 322; and Drew, Portrait of an Election, 119.
56Drew, Portrait, 315
57Ibid., 324.
5~ew Yark Times, 16 November 1980, 172.




increase by the Carter AdministratIOn at the end of 1980. Carter's 1979 defense budget
proposal of$126 billion was the largest in U.S. history. Carter's proposals for defense
spending raised 3 percent each year from 1978 to 1980. 61 These increases in proposed
and actual increases in Carter's defense spending must be evaluated with consideration to
the severe inflation during his presidency. The inflation rate in the U.S. rose 12.2 percent
from October 31, 1978 to October 31, 1978.62 Considering this economic reality, Carter's
defense spending increases were less revolutionary.
These actual and attempted increases did not satisfy conservative analysts,
Reagan or the American people. The attacks on the defense record of the Carter
administration proved successful according to polling sources. A University of Michigan
poll documented the effects of Reagan's attacks on the incumbent president. Of those
polled, 40 percent agreed "weak" described Carter "extremely well" or "quite well."63
Another 60 percent of those answering the survey chose "not too wei\" or "not well at
all" in evaluating the statement that Carter was a "strong presidentialleader.'>(,4 In
contrast, over 50 percent of those polled, who had an opinion, agreed that the
characteristic of "strong presidential leadership" applied to Reagan '"extremely" or "quite
well. '>65 Despite the subjective nature of polls, these conclusions give evidence public
opinion on defense and presidential strength played a role in determming the election.
In addition, other problems in the Carter Administration aided in Reagan's victory
in 1980. As earlier discussed, a sagging economy created widespread critIcism of Carter.
Rising inflation and oil prices plagued Carter's last years in office. The continued plight
of hostages taken at the United States' Embassy in Iran continued to be an issue in the
last days of the campaign. Similar to Carter's nuclear doctrine, the public questioned his
61U.S. President, Public Papers, 1: 187
6~ew York Times, 13 December 1979, 12.
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conviction and leadership in foreign and dometic policy. This credibility issue obviously
hurt Carter and aided Reagan in the election.
Ronald Reagan took up the arguments of the conservative analysts and used them
to create additional fear of Soviet aggression. The factuality of conservative arguments
and the motivations behind them are questionable. However, the concerns of this group
played a role in the outcome of the 1980 Presidential election. The conservatlve analysis
of a Soviet Nucl ear threat did not origi nate with Reagan, but he was aware of the
argument and it had tremendous influence on his career as a politician and world leader.
One could argue that conservative analysts influenced him to some degree. Reagan
placed a considerable amount of blame on the policies of President Carter for a
deterioration of the nation's nuclear position. His adoption and advertisement or nuclear
doctrine criticism played a key role in his subsequent victory. The question remained
whether President Reagan could improve on the nation's nuclear and foreign policy and





REAGAN'S NUCLEAR ARMS RECORD: 1981 - 1983
On October 2, 1981, newly-elected President Reagan announced his plan to
rectify the nation's ailing nuclear defenses. In conjunction with Secretary of State Caspar
Weinburger, the three goals of Reagan's initial nuclear program were to modernize the
triad of United States forces, end delays in the development of new programs, and
improve communications and controls systems vital to military forces. In the next five
years, he promised to deploy 100 B- 1 bombers and develop a new "stealth bomber," in
addition to expanding the Trident submarine force. Contrasting his plans to those of
President Carter, he pledged to deploy 200 MX missiles, as well as improve United States
civil defense. Reagan also announced a new plan for deterrence that would ensure the
safety of his nation and its allies. The most interesting promise Reagan made was that his
policies "will signal our resolve to maintain the strategtc balance, and th.is is the keystone
to any genuine agreement with the Soviets."1 Reagan identified nuclear arms reduction
treaties with the Soviet Union as a goal of hIS administration. However, he argued that a
buildup in the nation's nuclear forces was necessary before these negotiations could
begin. He believed the United States should engage in arms reduction talks from a
position of strength. Reagan argued that only this enhanced bargaining position would
produce arms reduction treaties favorable to the United States. He also claimed that he
wanted to maintain the strategic balance. This is curious because he campaigned on the
IPresident, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, "United
States Strategic Weapons Program:' The Weekly CompilatIon of Presidential Documenb
17, no 2 (2 October 1981), 1075.
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issue that the Soviet Union had an advantage in nuclear weapons. It is also important to
note that President Reagan identified nuclear reduction agreements with the Soviet Union
as a goal for his nuclear doctrine at the early date of] 981.
The president's goal of improving the nation's nuclear defenses would come at a
pnce. Increases in nuclear spending were only one part of Reagan's economic plans for
the country, which were dubbed "Reaganomics" in the early days of the administration.
In The Reagan Presidency, Wilbur Edel calls Reaganomics "the belief that uninhibited
freedom in economic activity is basic to all freedoms"2 This economic doctrine included
sharp reductions in income taxes, increases in military spending, and the pursuit of a
balanced budget. The pursuit of the goals came at the expense of domestic spending,
specifically welfare. Reagan soon abandoned his support of a balanced budget for
increased tax cuts in ]98]. Reagan believed these tax cuts would stimulate the nation's
stagnant economy. His initial tax initiative called for reductions of taxes to capital gains
and the reduction of "bracket creep," the government practice of forcing taxpayers into
higher Income brackets, increasing their payments. 3 Many of these tax cuts benefited
wealthier Americans, and Reaganomics failed to sttmulate the economy. A recession
crippled the economy through 1983. The failure of the president's economic programs
drew criticism in Congress and the in findings of public opinion polls. A 1982 New York
Times/CBS Poll showed 5] percent of Americans believed Reagan was to blame for the
country's economic problems. To the question "are you better off than you were a year
ago," 6] percent asked answered "no".4 Congressman Richard Ottinger called
Reaganomics a failure and stated it caused the recovery from recession to be "sickeningly
slow by historic standards."5 Dissent of Reaganomics ncreased as the administration
continually asked for additional military spending while cutting expenditures for
2Edel, Wilbur, The Reagan Presidency (New York: Hipocrene Books, ]992),44.
lIbid., 42.
4New York Times, ]9 January ]982, l.




Despite these economic pitfalls, Reagan claimed success against the Soviet
aggressive nuclear balance as early as August of 1981. Pointing to the successes of his
programs and the Soviets' reaction, he stated that the Soviet Union was concerned and "1
can understand their anguish. They are squealing like they're sitting on a sharp nail." He
claimed that "we're not going to let them get to the point of dominance...and they don't
like that.'''' Secondary historical literature does suggest that Reagan's programs
influenced Soviet strategic planning. Kokoshin states that in the 1980's, SovIet military
planners began to view the prospect of nuclear as negative He concludes that Soviet
planners believed they lacked the numerical advantages in nuclear weapons needed to
conduct a limited nuclear campaign in an effective manner.7 Reagan expected these
successes to lead to further increases in national security and breakthroughs in arms
reduction treaties.
In an effort to gain public support for additional nuclear spending in 1981, Reagan
and Weinburger again warned the nation of the Soviet Union's massive nuclear spending
program and its imminent threat. In August, Reagan reminded the country that the
Soviets had spent $300 billion more than the United States in past years and the result
was an imbalance in strategic nuclear delivery systems. This claim of imbalance in
nuclear forces contrasted with the statement he would later make in October claiming that
he only wished to maintain a strategic balance. He stated that "to aJlow this imbalance is
a threat to our national security" and that it was "my duty as President and all our
responsibility as citizens, to keep this country strong enough to remain free."8 Reagan
also stated he had infonnation that the Soviets were spending "about a hundred million in
6U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1981),
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Western Europe alone a few years ago."9 He did not provide a reliable source or basis for
this infonnation, but gave great emphasis to its threat to security. Reagan argued that the
Soviets had engaged in "the greatest military buildup in the history of man" and promised
that "it cannot be described as necessary for their defense. It is plainly a buildup that is
offensive in nature."l0 He had harsh words for the ideas behind the failed SALT II treaty
of his predecessor. Reagan criticized the treaty for allowing large increases In the
numbers of Soviet warheads and not providing reliable means for the United States to
verify reductions agreed to under SALT I I. 11
Secretary of Defense Weinburger made similar statements about the buildup of
Soviet forces and the need for modernization of United States forces. He told the Senate
Armed Services Committee in January 1981 that it was becoming "difficult, if not
impossible" to employ conventional forces or conduct diplomacy without a nuclear
strategic balance. He argued that an enhanced nuclear position "offers our best hope of
negotiating a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union."12 Weinburger
again promised nuclear buildup as a means to nuclear reduction treaties In the early days
of the administration. These declarations of Soviet nuclear threat by the Reagan
administration seemed long on the rhetonc of fear and short on specifics.
Claiming a Soviet nuclear threat and the need for buildup to solve it, Reagan
announced his 1982 military budget proposal. He asked Congress to increase military
spending by $7.2 billion over PreSIdent Carter's budget of$181.5 billion in 1981. He
also called for increases in the military budget of more than 20% for at least the next two
years. I) Supporting the president, Weinburger promised the budget would "significantly
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in all areas of the world vital to United States' national interest. He accused the Soviet
Union of worldwide aggression and stated the previous administration failed to build the
necessary mi litary power to meet these actions. 14 In response to these requests, the
Senate approved a $136.5 billion military authorizatIon bill with almost no SIgnificant
opposition while the House of Representatives approved a large part of another $222
billion request for the 1982 fiscal year beginning in October. The New York Times
called congressional approval of this budget "another clear victory" that "appeared only
to underscore the wide spread support In Congress for increased military spending. "I~
Weinburger promised this spending package would achieve the needed strategic balance
for the nation. Based on this statement, it was reasonable to assume this favorable cI imate
for military spending would reap rapid mcreases in national security, anns negotiations,
and the United States' foreign policy clout.
As Reagan's spending proposals passed Congress In 198], seeds of opposition
began to mount in the media and in Congress. Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri
confinned support existed for military spending but warned that "throWing money about
indiscriminately" would not be accepted. 16 He stated that Reagan's defense proposals
needed to be "established within the context ofa coherent national strategy. "17 Harsher
criticism about the direction and need for Reagan'5 spending proposals came from the
media. James Fallows, editorial writer tor the New York Times and editor of The
Atlantic, criticized the preSident for not ""discriminating between weapons that are
affective and those that merely cost a lot ofmoney."18 Fallows cannot be claSSIfied
among liberals generally opposed to measures strengthening the military. In the same
'4Ibid., 5 March 1981, 1.
15Ibid., 15 May 1981, 15
I('Congress, Senate, Sentator Eagleton of Missouri speaking on support for
President Reagan's·defense spending initiatives, 97th Congr., 1st sess., CongressIOnal
Record 127, pt. 22 (I Dec. ]980): 29223.
17lbid.,29226.
18New York Times, ]4 June 1981,19.
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article he criticized Reagan's policies, he also called for the re-institution ofa universal
draft to make the military more effective. 19 The fact conservatives such as Fallows
criticized the Reagan's defense policies as early as 1981 foreshadowed additional
problems for the admlllistration.
Budgeting increases continued in 1982. The Pentagon reported a record $114.5
billion increase in the cost of 44 major and future weapons systems. Military officials
stated that the cost estimates retlected the first "complete planning and budgeting cycle
under the Reagan administration."2o These new expenditures had not produced any
significant arms reduction treaties by 1982. Opposition began to a rise against the
administrations nuclear spending increases In 1982. In September, Congress passed a
budget resolution calling for an $8 billion reduction in military spending compared to
what the administration requested. The president originally accepted this reduction,
against the wishes of Weinburger. President Reagan soon changed his position and
backed Weinburger's refusal. 21
The adminstration's plans for the MX missile came under attack in December.
The House of Representatives voted to reject funds for the procurement of the missile.
Steven B. Roberts, an editorial writer for the New York Times, stated the vote reflected a
belief on Capitol Hill that the military buildup has "gone too far, too [ast.'>22 He also
believed the defeat of procurement funds for the missile was a victory for the budding
nuclear freeze movement, organizing support around the nation to lobby against the bill
and other increases in United States' nuclear weapons. Democratic Congressman Charles
Wilson, a hawk on military matters, called the president's arguments on the feasibility of
a nuclear war unreal and immoral. Wilson stated administratIOn plans for MX missiles in
"dense pack" formation, on movable tracks in Wyoming "sound like Pac-Man," the
'9Ibid., 14 June 1981,19.
2°1bid., 20 March 1982, 1
2IIbid., 16 September 1982, 1.
22Ibid., 7 December 1982,23.
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popular video game. 23 Roberts and Wilson's statements give evidence to the existence of
a growing group of critics to Reagan's defense policies among the media and in
Congress.
In addition, 50 Republican con!:,'Tessmen voted against the MX bill. Republican
Congressman Jack Edwards, who led the fight for the bill, urged the Pentagon to dispel
survivability concerns and illustrate the need for the MX. This questioning of the
effectiveness and justification for the missile by proponents of Reagan's program shows
problems in the administration's planning. {fmembers of Reagan's own party
questioned the need for the MX, there were obviously serious weaknesses in the
proposal.
Despite killing the MX bill, the house decided to retain $2.5 billion offunding for
research and development of the missile. Thomas A. Foley, Democratic Whip, stated
"there is a strong consensus to increase the military budget, and you shouldn't read into
the M:X vote that Congress is marching away from defense ''24 There was still approval
for nuclear weapon increases. It was the burden of the Reagan administration to propose
a reasonable plan to a receptive Congress. The defeat of the MX proposal was one of the
first substantial defeats of Reagan's defense proposals in Congress. It was an early
example of what was growing opposition to the administration's defense proposals.
While bipartisan support existed for nuclear spending in 1982, Congress became
increasingly unwilling to accept administration programs without questioning their cost
and actual benefit to defense.
In March of 1983, Weinburger made statements that the United States was
making progress in achieving the military posture he envisioned. These arguments
followed and attempted to justify a Pentagon report called "Soviet Military Power" that
called for more military spending. He argued that despIte contmued Soviet military
23fbid., 7 December 1982,23.




buildups in the 1980's, "I think we have begun to catch Up."25 This statement was an
attempt to justify additional military spending. He estimated, however, that it would take
at least five more years to regain the strategic and conventional forces needed to be an
effective deterrent to the Soviet Union. This statement counters his earlier claim that the
budget plan of 1981 would "significantly and quickly strengthen" United States'
deterrence capabilities26 Tass, the official Soviet press agency called the Pentagon report
"a mass of doctored data full of shamelessly manipulated facts and groundless
contentions."27 This statement was politically motivated. However, the Soviet Union did
not demonstrate a wanning of relations with the United States. The Soviets were not
rushing to negotiate reduction treaties in reaction to Reagan's modernization program, as
the president and secretary of defense suggested in 1981.
Resistance to budget increases in defense rose to new levels in 1983. The
administration called for a $245.3 billion military budget for the 1984 fiscal year. In
response to Reagan's proposal, the Senate Anned Services asked the administration to
come up with cuts in the budget. In addition, the committee called for military personnel
cuts from 110,000 to 140,000 people instead of the 37,000 the administration requested.
Democratic Senator Carl Levin accused Weinburger of "exaggerated rhetonc" and "one
sided charts" to depict the United States falling behind the U.S.S.R. in military power and
nuclear annaments. 2~
Reagan sent a message to Weinburger, who was testifying before the Senate
Budget Committee, to oppose any cuts in the proposed military budget. In the message,
Reagan instructed him to say "we have reached the bone and any further cuts would do
severe damage to our national security."29 Reagan did this in order to place additional
25Ibid., 10 March] 983, 1.
26Jbid.,5 March 1981, 1.
27Jbid., ]0 March 1981, 1.
28lbid.,2 February, 1983, 15
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pressure on Congress to pass his military budget in its current state. He challenged
anyone in Congress to be speci fie on what cuts to make and to real ize that "his cuts mean
cutting our commitments to allies or inviting greater risk or both."10 Weinburger also
refused the committee's request to identify the lowest priority items in the budget. He
commented that the country could not put off "unpopular military programs" for a few
more domestic programs at the expense of national security. This lack of flexibility
demonstrated the Reagan administration's squandering of opportunities to work with the
Democratic Congress for the increase in mi Iitary spending it wished for.
Reagan made strong statements against cutting the defense budget. He argued
that "there is no logical way to cut defense by X amount." He called talk of cuts "the
same kind of talk that led democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930's and
invented the tragedy of World War 11."11 Reagan claimed a freeze in nuclear arms would
be a reward for the Soviets "for their massive buildup whi Ie preventing us from
modernizing our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces."12
In January of 1983, the president defended his defense policies and reminded the
country of the progress he believed his administration had made. He stated that when he
took office, "there was a real question then about how well we could meet a cnsis" and
that the nation had to engage in a "major modernization program to ensure we could deter
aggression and preserve the peace."11 He stated that with NATO in 1979 the United
States began to develop new weapons as an incentive to the Soviet Union to meet in
"serious" anns control negotiations. He failed to mention this buildup was initiated under
President Carter. He claimed that in arms control, the two vital factors are leverage and
determination. He argued that there was no hope of the Soviets engaging in serious arms
control negotiations when he took office. Reagan stated that the Soviets "had all the







marbles" in 1981. Specifically, this statement referred to the aging bomber force of the
United States compared to the Soviet Union. Reagan claimed in 1981 "our bombers were
older than the pilots who flew them" and "today that's no longer the case."J4 He
reminded the nation that he was building badly needed new submarines and bombers to
balance the threat to United States land-based missiles.
However, the president quickly changed his posture on the strategic balance of
forces in March of the same year. He claimed the Soviets were adding an average of
three new nuclear warheads a week and had] ,300 in 1983.J~ He reminded the public that
the United States was not makmg equal deployments. In attempt to gamer support tor
additional spending, Reagan changed his tone on this issue from one of extolling great
progress to stating great danger and a need for continued buildup. This wavering on the
issue of strategic balance brings the effectiveness of the administration' s nuclear
modernization program into serious question.
The President's Commission on Strategic Forces gave further arguments to the
Senate for deployment of the MX missile in 1983. The commission submitted a report of
its findings to the Senate in April] 983 that was endorsed by former Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense Kissi nger, and fonner Secretary of Defense
Brown. J6 The repon argued that without a modest employment ofMX missiles, arms
control agreements would be difficult to achieve. Members argued that the primary goal
of the buildup was still to induce the Soviets into nuclear reduction agreements. General
Brent Scowcroft of the commission called for the deployment of around 100 MX missi les
to modernize United States' forces and show a sense of national cohesion and will on the
issue. Scowcroft stated the MX deployment was needed to rectify United States'
J4Ibid., 1:50.
3~Jbid., 1:439.
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weakness in the throw weight of nuclear weapons. 37 James Schlessinger, Senior
Counselor to the commission, continued on this theme of asymmetry between the
superpowers by stating the Soviets still enjoyed an asymmetry in counterforce
capabilities In 1983.'R
A new aspect appeared in Reagan's nuclear doctrine in 1983. The New York
Times reported that a "group of experts" had urged the president to order an increase in
long range research on "exotic technologies" of nuclear defense 39 At the center of these
proposals was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) or "star wars" as sarcastically
labeled by Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy. Reagan announced his SOl proposal in
conjunction with another strong appeal for mil itary spending. The basics of the plan
were to employ satellites in space to destroy incoming Soviet missiles with a yet-to-be
developed lasertechnology. Reagan called the proposal "a vision of the future which
offers hOpe."40 According to the president, SOl would be strictly defensive in nature- as
opposed to Mutual Assured Destruction's reliance on offensive weapons to provide
security from nuclear attack. To justify thi:-; new defensive program, he asked "Would it
not be better to save lives than to avenge them?"41 Senior administration officials stated
SOl did not threaten the USSR because it was purely defensive in nature. A difficult
issue involving this proposal was its relation to the Anti-Ballistic MIssile Treaty
outlawing anti-nuclear missile technology. The Reagan administration maintained SOl
did not currently violate the terms of the treaty because it was still in the research and
development stage. The administration did not explain how this program becoming a
reality would not violate the treaty.
Reagan's SOl proposal illuminated some substantial problems in his nuclear
37Ibid.,3.
3RIbid.,6.
3'JNew York Times, 24 March 1983,32.
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policies. White House officials stated the president was motivated to announce SDI plans
because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had Informed him that land based missile systems,
including the new MX missile, "seemed to be increasingly vulnerable to attack." This
statement shows weakness in the administration's early promise to create strategic
stability in rapid fashion, with the MX missile as a key part of these plans:2 The New
York Times stated that government officials reported SDI was a concerted effort by the
president to give priority to undeveloped technologies instead of employing additional
weapons systems in a more rapid fashion. This brings the Reagan promise of expedient
nuclear security further into question.
A second addition to the Department of Defenses' 1981 study of Soviet Military
Power, published in 1983, compared Reagan's military policies and the activities of the
Soviet Union. Since the first edition of this report in 198 I, the Department of Defense
concluded that the margin between Soviet and United States expenditures on defense had
decreased. This was attributed to a slowing of Soviet military expenditures in 1981.
However, the report stated that the Soviet Union had produced 2,000 ICBMs to the
United States' 350 in the two year time period since the first study 4 3 The report called
the rate of upgrade in Soviet forces since 1981 "extraordinary" and stated that there were
no signs of a slowdown in these trends. In addition, the 1983 report continued to
maintain that the "global military balance has been shifting steadily against the United
States and its Allies,,44 The report promised the president's programs "would help to
redress the adverse trends in the military balance... "45 However, the report did not give
an immediate time at which a military balance would be achieved and gave no indication
of a lessening of the Soviet threat since Reagan took office. The promises of the report
42Ibid.,5 November 1983,32.
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for an improved strategic situation for the United States was highly contingent on more
years of military spending and spoke oflittle immediate impact as of 1983.
Criticism of the need and effectiveness of Reagan's modernization of nuclear
forces mounted as Reagan's first term progressed. In some instances, criticism overthe
effectiveness of Reagan's nuclear defense doctrines came from his own political party.
One of these critics was Representative Robert Walker, the ranking minority leader of the
House Committee on Science and Technology. In 1982, Walker stated that "today we are
at a low point in our ability to defend ourselves and our all ies. ''-l~ Strong concerns also
existed on the adminstration's strategic planning for the survivability ofmi1itary
hardware, such as hardened missile silos. Dr. Jack Geiger of the School of Biomedical
Education at City College of New York argued that "the concept of survivability itself,
which is central to both our military and civil defense planning, is a fantasy."47 This
testimony weakens the technical credibility of many of Reagan's new weapons,
specifically the administrations to the enhanced survivability of the MX missile.
The scientific community also offered strong argument against the possibility
of a limited nuclear war not escalating to a global or catastrophic level. Dr. Sydney Orell
of Stanford University pointed out that there was no technical basis for control of a
nuclear war once missiles were launched. He stated that once the nuclear threshold was
crossed "there will inevitably be a broad delegation down the line of authority for nuclear
release.,,48 Drel1 further argued that in 1982, leaders in both the Soviet Union and the
United States were erroneously confident in the abilities of civil defense systems. He
argued this incorrect belief in the utility of civil defense also contributed to the belief in a
limited conflict with substantial survival of world population and infrastructure. Reagan
criticized Carter on his preparedness for a limited nuclear conflict and justified his
46House, Committee on Science and Technology, The Consequences of Nuclear




nuclear buildup on the need to prepare for such an engagement. The research of a
majority of the scientific community against the possibility of such a conflict weakens
these campaign contentions.
In 1984, testimony before the Joint Committee on Economics brought forward
further scientific and strategic criticisms of the adminstration's policies in 1984. Senator
William Proximire, Vice-Chairman of this committee argued that the Reagan
administration had done little to prepare public policy after a nuclear exchange in the type
of limited conflict it deemed possible. Many scientists at this meeting testified about the
effects of a nuclear winter that would begin after this type of conflict. A nuclear winter
was described as a period in which soot and ashes from explosions would cover the sky
and block the sun from reaching areas near nuclear explosions. The growth of vegetation
and overall habitability of the planet would be considerably affected by this phenomenon.
Richard L. Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, stated the actual effects and
strength of a nuclear winter were not known and his department's estimates put it at a
matter of months. 49 Statements by scientists at the committee session placed the length of
a nuclear winter at one year, which they considered a conservative estimate. Wagner
could offer no definite plan for government policy towards a nuclear winter. One must
find it disturbing the administration favored deployment of medium range missiles in
Europe as a regional deterrence and did not research a plan for the aftermath of their
deployment. The scientific communities' statements about the high probability of a
limited exchange escalating to a global conflict also bring a troubling point. If scientific
research on the chances of escalation were correct, the United States was also in need of a
nuclear winter policy as well. Thus, for all the emphasis the Reagan administration
placed on nuclear doctrine, it did not sufficiently prepare for the aftermath of the use of
the weapons it was deploying.
49House, Senate. Committee on Economics, Consequences of Nuclear War 98th




Another highly criticized initiative was the Strategic Defense Initiative. The
strongest source of opposition to SOl came from nuclear scientists concerning its
feasibility. The Union of Concerned Scientists was an organizion largely dedicated to
criticizing the buildip and possible use of nuclear weapons, including SDI. Jack Ruina
was an electrical engineering professor at M.LT. and analyst for the Union of Concerned
Scientists. Ruina stated that the majority of his colleagues had serious doubts about the
feasibility of this system. He argued that many U.S. scientists had refused to criticize
SDI only because many of them were employed by the government. He stated there was
a widespread fear among government employees that they should not question the
technological basis of President Reagan's space-based defense programs. so
The Union of Concerned Scientists also questioned the feasibility of the
technology involved in making the program a reality, stating that the necessary
technology did not exist. In addition, this group argued if a breakthrough in technolo!:,l)!
occmed, the Soviets were in a better position for rapid production of it. 51 This group also
evaluated the effectiveness of a fully-deployed SDI system. They concluded that the
outcome of the system's deployment would be the creation of "a defense of precarious
reliability, confronted by offensive nuclear forces designed to circumvent and overwhelm
it."S2 The Union of Concerned Scientists concluded mutual arms reductions were a more
productive means to the reduction of the threat of nuclear weapons than the SOl proposal.
This group's agenda against the policies of Reagan and the use nuclear weapons is clear.
Their statements on the benefits of arms reduction treaties must be considered subjective
and without basis in diplomatic experience. However, their criticism of the feasibility of
SOl cannot be ignored due to their expertise in this area.
As late as 1983, Congress questioned the United States' ability to defend Europe
SONew York Times, 16 November 1983, 8.






from Soviet aggression. The House Anned Services Committee concluded that the shift
of the nuclear balance was impairing the credibility of a NATO nuclear response to non-
nuclear Soviet aggression. The allies' ability to discourage a conventional Soviet attack
against Europe was referred to as "extended deterrence." This comminee concluded
Soviet advances in tactical and strategic nuclear weapons had reduced the abil ity of the
allies to maintain the strength of extended deterrence." The comminee stated that
increases were needed in the nuclear arsenal of the allies to maintain extended deterrence.
They stated for extended deterrence to maintain its credibility it would require "a good
deal of planning and hudgetlng. "~4 These statements show that after two years of the
administration's nuclear spending, serious problems remained unsolved in the nuclear
defense of American allies.
In conclusion, Reagan's first two years in office saw a definite commitment to
increasing military funding in the interest of national security. The administration
rectified the military spending imbalance of the United States in respect to the Soviet
Union. Also, Secretary of State George Shultz was correct in hlS analysis that the United
States' nuclear policy was not totally rei iant on arms negotiations as the only means of
pursuing a strategic balance during Reagan's first years. Instead, he argued that the
administration increasingly relied on a buildup of nuclear weapons "to secure ourselves
against the possibility of failure" in arms negotiations.~< However, this went against
Reagan's early goal of gaining arms reduction agreements as a direct result of the
nation's nuclear buildup. In addition, after its first two years in office, no adm inistration
official indicated a significant change in the strategic imbalance of forces to the Soviet
Union. This must be seen as a failure due to the 1981 promises of President Reagan and
53House, Committee on Armed Services, Improved Conventional Force
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Secretary of Defense Weinburger to alleviate an imbalance of nuclear arms and threats to
national security in a rapid amount of time. As of 1983, the adminstration's program for
alleviating the problem of nuclear asymmetry relied on an unspecified number of





NUCLEAR ARMS AND FOREIGN POLfCY: 1981-1983
President Reagan felt positively about the effects of the first two years of his
nuclear and military policies on the United States' ability to conduct foreign policy. He
recalled, '"when I took office in January 1981, I was appalled by what J found: American
planes that couldn't fly and American ships that couldn't saiL"1 Reagan contended this
situation was not only a direct risk to mil1tary security, but also diminished the force of
United States' foreign policy. He stated that under the Carter administration, the Soviets
had no reason to engage mutual anns reduction treaties because they held a strategic
advantage in both nuclear and conventional weapons. He argued his military program
and buildup had changed that posture. Reagan now boasted "the Soviets are now at the
negotiating table... without our planned developments, they wouldn't be there."2 This
1983 statement was made without the administration having signed any tangible
reductions.
One contributing factor to the failed negotiations of the first two years of the
administration came in Reagan's selection of arms negotiating personnel. Reagan chose
Paul Nitze as chief arms negotiator for his administration. Nitze was outspoken in his
call for increases in United States' nuclear weaponry and mistrust of the Soviet Union.
These views can be seen in his 1976 article "Deterring our Deterrent." Based on these
views, Carter passed over Nitze for the position of chief arms negotiator because the
president believed he was too "hawkish" to conduct profitable negotiations with the




Soviet Union. Carter was not alone in this judgment of Nitze. Former Secretary of
Defense Weinburger also feared that Nitze's beliefs would hurt arms negotiations. In
addition to the possibility ofNitze hampering relations with the Soviets, Weinburger
worried that he would alienate U.S. European alhes. 3 Statements of Weinburger, and
Nitze's own published views, demonstrated that Reagan made a poor selection for this
critical position.
In Europe opposition to the United States' nuclear buildup increased during
Reagan's first term in office. In response the United States purchased a live satellite and
radio transmission to Europe to communicate a new weapons reduction proposal.
Reagan announced his Zero Option Plan, which proposed that the United States would
cancel the research towards the development of the Pershing missile. In return the
Soviets would dismantle their existing SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. While gaming
favorable reaction among American allies, this proposal was almost certainly doomed to
failure. The obvious problem was the fact Reagan asked the Soviets to reduce their
existing arsenal of nuclear weapons in exchange for the United States not continuing
research towards the possible creation of a new missile.4 Reagan criticized the Soviets
refusal as an example of their imperialistic nature and goals. He further accused the
Soviets of attempting to destroy the existing world community of nations in favor of
aggressive imperialism.
Reagan later admitted in a statement to the press that the Soviets entirely if,'l1ored
the Zero Option proposition. He called this a "source of deep disappointment."~ In light
of this setback, Reagan proposed a second agreement that would reduce the United States
planned deployment of a smaller number of Pershing II and ground launched cruise
missiles in return for an equal reduction of existing Soviet forces. This proposal was a
3Talbot, D~adly Gambits, 53.
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smaller reduction but on the same tenns as Zero Option. This second proposal also called
for ehmination of existing Soviet forces for promises not to deploy future United States'
weapons. Reagan did not learn from his prior mistake in judgment on Zero Option. Due
to an unwillingness to compromise, he failed to propose an af,Tfeement that had a realistic
chance of rati fication. These actions brought Reagan's sincerity for anns reductions in
1983 into question. This is troubling because Reagan announced his desire for mutual
arms reductions after a United States' buildup at the beginnIng of his presidency.
Furthennore, the Zero Option proposal did not gain the support from Europe
which the administration had hoped. European nations resisted this proposal to reduce
the number ofintennediate missiles on their continent. United States' allies such as
Great Britain and France considered their nuclear forces vital to their defense. This was
because the conventional forces of these nations were hopelessly ovennatched by those
of the Soviet Union. European allies saw their nuclear forces as the main deterrent to a
conventional Soviet attack. The nations of Europe were against the removal of their
nuclear weapons because they would be dependent on the United States' nuclear arsenal
for their defense. Another fear by these nations was that without nuclear weapons of
their own, the United States and the Soviet Union would engage in a nuclear confl iet
limited to the continent of Europe. Zero Option was therefore opposed by leaders in
many nations in Europe because the allies did not want their primary means of their
defense, nuclear weapons, removed from their direct control.('
In West Gennany, Zero Option was opposed for different reasons. The majority
of the nation was beginning to align against Reagan's policies. Unlike many Western
European nations, West Gennany did not wish to use nuclear weapons as a means of
defense from Soviet aggressIOn. Zero Option was aimed at pacifYing West German
resistance to American deployment of nuclear weapons within German borders. The





failed negotiations between the two superpowers on Zero Option fostered increased
sentiment against the Reagan administration. In 1982, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
mformed Nitze that support for additional missile deployment in West Germany was sure
to collapse completely.7 The Soviet Union stated that the United States was forcing an
end to reduction negotiations by its planned deployment of missiles in 1983. This belief
was accepted in West Germany, especially with the political left. The United States
considered negotiating arms reductions specifically for West Germany to alleviate this
problem. However, Reagan advisor Richard Burt worried that negotiating such a treaty
would create resistance to deployment in other allied nations. 8 The Zero Option proposal,
meant to galvanize support for United States' nuclear doctrine, instead created an
increase in division and dissension for nuclear defense.
Europeans also attacked the Strategic Defense Initiative. As discussed earlier,
United States' allies in Europe were at a strategic disadvantage in conventional forces to
the Soviet Union. Western European nations relied on nuclear missiles as a deterrent to
conventional Soviet aggression. The entire premise of NATO nuclear strategy was based
on the doctrine of deterrence. Reagan's statements in reference to abandoning deterrence
in favor of SOl womed European leaders. This was because the Reagan administration
had given no mdication in 1983 that SOl would be used to protect Europe. Leaders in
Europe feared the United States would be more willing to sacrifice its nuclear arsenal in
Western Europe through arms reduction treaties if SOl was implemented, threatening
their security from conventional attack.9 The manner in which SOl was presented was
also problematic. Robert Osgood of the School of Advanced International Studies
(SAlAS) at John Hopkins University stated that the initiative was presented to European
leaders in the incorrect context. He believed the plan would have been more acceptable
7Talbot, Deadlv Gambits, 92.
8Ibid., 131.
9Tucker and others, eds., SOl and U.S. Foreign Policy, 66.
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had the administration introduced the system as a means of missile-site defense or a
measure against the Soviet's strategic superiority. Instead, Reagan introduced SOl as a
means to "make nuclear weapons obsolete."lo This method of presentation fueled
European resistance because of their reliance on nuclear weapons for conventional
deterrence to the Soviet Union.
In addition to fearing an abandonment of deterrence, European leaders had other
concerns about SOL The French government resisted SOl because it would only
encourage the Soviets to construct a similar system. They feared it was just another
aspect of the arms race done at the possible expense of European security through a
decline in the United States' commitment to missiles in Europe. General Bernard
Rogers, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, also expressed concern SOl would
draw funds allotted to the defense of Europe. David Calleo of the SAlAS also agreed
with this perception, stating many Europeans "fear that the urge to 'decouple' from the
risks of nuclear deterrence has been, all along, a principal driving force behind SOL "I I
Osgood also stated that France and England would be resistant to SOlon the basis that it
violated the ABM treaty unless the program was complemented with additional
protectIOn for the nuclear missiles in their nations. 12 Other Europeans feared SOl would
encourage the Soviet Union to engage in a nuclear strike before the United States could
complete the project in order to avoid a position of strategic inferiority.
The Soviet Union attempted to take advantage of European fears over SDI.
During discussions on a treaty on the deployment of Pershing II missi les, the Soviets
called upon the United States to choose between banning SDI or reducing missiles in
France and Britain to complete an agreement. 13 This was a Soviet attempt to divide the








introduction, SDI had increasingly become a point of friction between the United States
and its allies.
Despite the frightening possibilities of SOl, the reaction against it in Europe was
not extreme. This was because the European community doubted the feasibility of the
project. They were even more doubtful ofSDJ's enduring impact on constructive anTIS
reduction treaties between the superpowers, even if it was totally deployed. This
skepticism damaged Reagan's entire nuclear defense program. David Calleo argued that
the president's rhetoric on making nuclear weapons obsolete created more fears than the
physical realities of the system. 14 According to Calleo, SOl caused a decline in European
faith in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear defense doctrine and its technological baSIS.
Concern about American nuclear policies was evident in the actions of the Soviet
Union from 1981 to 1983. The Soviets renewed a propaganda campaign fonnerly used
against the nuclear buildup of the Carter administration. This was partially due to their
concerns over Weinburger's suggestions to renew the neutron bomb program. Morris
Rothenburg's report to the SAlAS stated that the administration's nuclear modernIzation
incited direct responses in the Soviet media and "more impressively, by indirect
responses manifest in leadership policies" of the Soviets in 1981.1~ He stated it was clear
from his study of Soviet writings that they believed Reagan's modernization plans would
give the United States "new abilities." He also stated the Soviets were treating the matter
'with "the utmost seriousness."16 Rothenburg argued the Soviets were also very
concerned with Reagan's plans to deploy additional cruise missiles, stating the program
"seems to have exposed Moscow's greatest fears. "17 He used the massive Soviet
propaganda effort as evidence of SOVIet concern on the issue.
Additional evidence shows that the Soviet Union was concerned about Reagan's
14fbid., 109.






nuclear buildup and foreign policy. Declassified Soviet documents show Reagan's
actions concerned Politburo members such as Yuri Andropov. He stated on May 31,
1983, that "If you look at the events in the Western countries, you can sayan anti-soviet
alliance is being fonned out there." Andropov infonned the Politburo that Reagan was "a
bearer and creator of all anti-soviet ideas" that were form ing this "anti-soviet alliance."
Adropov considered the formation of this alliance'to be very dangerous. Politburo
member A.A. Gromyko argued that Reagan had effectively gained support for the
deployment of Pershing II missiles in many European nations. Gromyko stated the
Soviet Union should attempt to involve Britain and France increasingly in arms reduction
talks to try and stop this deployment, whIch he considered dangerous to the Soviet
Union. IR These statements clearly show Soviet leaders were on the defensive m reaction
to Reagan's policies.
However, Rothenburg claimed his research of Soviet writings showed their
military analysts believed the modernization program actually began in 1979 under
Carter. '9 The Soviets obviously encountered a new level of commitment to
modernization from President Reagan compared to his predecessor. While credit must be
given to Carter for setting the program into motion, the Reagan admin istration' s program
shook the Soviet propaganda machine from its sense of complacency to U.S. nuclear
policy. This concern must be connected to the threat of Reagan's modernization to
Soviet military security.
Rothenburg argues that Reagan's Zero Option speech also had an effect on the
Soviet Union. He argued that after the speech, "the Soviets clearly found themselves on
the defensive." Brezhnev rejected Zero Option based on their long argument position
that medium-range missile parity already existed in Europe 20 The Soviets eventually
18"More Documents from the Russian Archives," Cold War International History




offered a counterproposal completely unacceptable to the United States and NATO.
After this counterproposal failed, the Soviets continued their propaganda campaign
against the United States. They questioned the Reagan administration's sincerity to
negotiate on arms reduction. In 1982, the Soviets stil1 believed a propaganda campaif,'Tl
could discourage nuclear weapons modernization and effectively divide the United States
and its allies. 21 While not producing significant arms reduction treaties by 1983,
Reagan's nuclear policies caused increased Soviet concern over the possibility oftippmg
the strategic balance in favor of the United States.
It is also certain that diplomatic relations between the two nations had not
improved as a result of Reagan's nuclear modernization program. Charles Percy,
Chainnan of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations af,'Teed with this notion. He
stated "the peril that we are facing is greater now than it was two and a half years ago
when this administration took over."22 Percy attributed this condition on the "crescendo
of administration rhetoric. "2~ Thomas 1. Watson Jr., former United States Ambassador to
the Soviet Union, stated that the two superpowers were making "no serious effort to
reach an agreement on even the basic question of preventing a further spiral of the anTlS
race."24 Watson accused the Reagan administration of not prioritizing arms control and
pointed out that its actions also threatened the spirit of past arms agreements.
Others seriously questioned the commitment of the administration to arms
control. Four officials from past administrations testified before the Senate on their
evaluation of the administration's arms reduction record. They argued the
administration's policy of conducting an anTlS buildup to induce fruitful negotiations was
flawed. Paul Wanke, former nuclear arms negotiator in the Carter administration called
2ITbid., 160.






Reagan's "arms race theory ofarrns control" incompatible with serious bargaining. 25
Leslie Gelb, national security correspondent for the New York Times, pointed out that by
1983 "even by the reckoning of Reagan administration officials themselves they have yet
to achieve their first diplomatic success."26 Ge1b later conceded that the buildup and
development of forces could be valuable to diplomacy and could create an atmosphere of
negotiation with a potentially hostile force. He stated that even the United States' allies
in Europe who felt that Reagan had overdone his nuclear buildup to encourage arms
negotiations preferred his policies to those of Carter. He also criticized the Reagan
administration for using nuclear buildup to "compel capitulation rather than induce
compromise."27 Gelb concl uded that" there is a mounting sense the world has become a
more dangerous place" and Reagan "has not done much to reduce those dangers."28
While Reagan's policies may have been preferred to those of Carter, they still failed to
produce favorable diplomatiC results in the minds of many domestic leaders and foreign
allies.
Perhaps one of the strongest criticisms of Reagan's nuclear doctrine and its
relating diplomacy came in the passage of House Joint Resolution 13. The bil.1 issued a
call for a mutual and verifiable freeze in nuclear anns buildup by both superpowers. The
resolution called for the upcoming START negotiations to have several definite
objectives from the American perspective. The resolution stated START should "pursue
a complete halt to the arms race" and the two sides should decide "how to achieve a
mutual and verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further development"' of all
2~New York Times, 23 June ]983,21.
26Leslie Gelb, "Reagan, Power, and the World," New York Times Magazine,






nuclear weapons. 29 The resolution also ca1led for expedient anns reductions through
measures such as numerical ceilings and annual percentage-based reductions. This
resolution passed the House of Representatives by a margin of278-149. Clement J
Zablocki, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated the issue ofa mutual
freeze needed to be addressed because of the tremendous public interest and concern
"'about the diminished role of anns control in the formulation of u.s. national security
policy" and their "immediate" calls for anns reduction.-10 The call for a freeze on nuclear
developments struck directly against the administration's plans to induce arms reductions
through upgrading the quality and quantity of the United States' nuclear forces. Prior to
new negotiations with the Soviets, the American people and their representatives in the
House of Representatives seemed substantially opposed to the premise of Reagan's
nuclear doctrine. This resistance definitely demonstrates flaws In the administration's
policies and its ability to conduct anns negotIations.
President Reagan's nuclear doctrine had a mixed effect on the United States'
ability to conduct foreign policy. It must be acknowledged that thIS buildup generated
concern in the Soviet Union. However, the actual buildup, contrary to the campaign
rhetoric of Reagan, was begun by Carter. The Soviet Union did not engage in new
invasions or violations of rights to nations outside of their sphere of influence prior to
Reagan's election. It is reasonable their concern over the rise in nuclear readiness played
a role in this curtailment of Soviet aggression. The Soviet foreign policy was more
conservative from 198] to ]983 compared it character in the Carter years. Evidence in
Soviet sources indicate Reagan's nuclear defense and foreign policy actions placed the
Soviet leadership on the defensive. It is important to note the Soviet Union was also
experiencing domestic and financial crises because of the costs of its intense military
29House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Calling for a Mutual and Verifiable
Freeze On and Reductions in Nuclear Weapons 98th Congr., Ist session, 17 Feb





modernization program. It is reasonahle to conclude these problems also contributed to
the curbing of Soviet nuclear and foreihl'Jl policy aggression. However, these gains came
at a considerable price. Administration projects such as SOl created division between the
United States and its allies. Despite spending more funds on nuclear defense, the United
States' overall commitment to the defense of its allies wac; also questioned. Most
important, from 1981 to 1983, the administration failed to achieve one of its primary
foreign policy and diplomatic goals, significant anns reduction treaties with the Soviet
Union. This failure can be attributed to the Reagan admimstration's lack of flexibility in





CULTURAL REACTION TO REAGAN'S NUCLEAR ARMS POLlCY
The reaction within the United States to President Reagan's nuclear doctrine was
considerable. As the administration implemented its policies, the public increasingly
reacted with a mixture of disapproval and panic. The statements of religious leaders, the
increase in nuclear protest, and the statements of citizens themselves reflected these
sentiments. From 1981 to 1983, the number of functions and overall strength of anti-
nuclear armament f:,JTOUPS steadily rose compared to their prevalence during the Carter
administration. The actions of the Reagan Administration were the dominant catalyst for
the rise of these groups and other forms of anti-nuclear sentiment.
The Catholic Church traditionally supported the notion of defensive wars, under
certain conditions. A "just-war criteria" had existed within the Catholic church in past
centuries that determined the proper justification for military behavior. This criteria
traditionally held that the taking of human life was wrong unless it conformed to the
principles ofjustice. A war could only be just if undertaken for defensive purposes
Indiscriminate killing did not fall within the realm ofjust-war criteria in any situation. J A
group of Catholic authors published a work on the implications of nuclear war to just war
criteria. In this work, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, James T., Johnson
argued that nuclear weapons did not fall into the just war criteria. Johnson further argued
that deterrence as a defensive strategy was allowable. He stated the targeting of
population centers was not allowable. These statements show the Catholic church was
IDonald Davidson, Nuclear Weapons and the Amencan Churches: Ethical
PositIOns on Modem Warfare (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, !983), 19.
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opposed to some aspects of United States' nuclear policy prior to the Reagan
Administration. ThIs opposition rose to new levels during his presidency.
Reagan's statements on the use of nuclear weapons in 1981 spurred this increase
in Catholic opposition. Donald Davidson argued that Reagan's position at this time
created "fervent discussion about the risk of nuclear war."2 In contrast to the position of
Johnson, Bishop John O'Connor's statements in 1983 were an example of this increasing
opposition. O'Connor condemned the indiscriminate destruction that would be caused in
cities and other large population centers. He stated that the Catholic church "seriously
questions" the strategy of nuclear deterrence, due to its threats to civilization as a whole.'
O'Connor did not condemn a defensive or limited war against the military targets of an
attacking nation. He was not against the possession of weapons of mass destruction.
O'Connnor stated that the church called for the eventual goal of banning a1l nuclear
weapons and urged reductions begin Immediately. These statements show considerable
opposition to Reagan's policies in the Catholic leadership.
The Catholic Church also offered its own plan for a "morally legitimate defense."
Catholic author James T. Johnson gave conditions for this defense in 1981. Non-
combatants would be protected from the threat of attack from weapons of mass
destruction. He argued that defense strategies should have the flexibil ity to respond to
different levels of aggression. a statement against the reliance on MAD. He called for the
removal of strategic nuclear weapons in favor of "morally usable weapons." He did not
believe the policies of the Reagan administration wen~ moving toward these proposals.
He considered the MX missile and anti-ballistic missile systems equally unfavorable
when compared to past proposals. He did not see space-based defense systems as a






to ensure safety through a nuclear buildup went against the beliefs of the Catholic church.
The Catholic Church also opposed space-based defense systems that the administration
considered beneficial to the defense of population centers. These opinions of the
Catholic church did not receive substantial attention from the administration in 1981.
Displeased with the reaction of the administration to its written statements,
Catholic leaders mobilized to take more active measures of opposition. Pax Christi, a
group of Catholics advocating a pacifist position to nuclear war, was founded during
Reagan's first tenn. Pax Christi was opposed to the traditional position of deterrence
adopted by past presidents. Pax Christi considered deterrence a "morally bankrupt
position." They argued on its current path, deterrence would lead to war instead of
preventing it. However, the experience of this group demonstrated an increase activity
during Reagan' s first years. The number of bishops affiliated with Pax Christi rose from
3 to 60 by 1983. ~ This rise in bishop membership came despite the group lacking official
endorsement from the Catholic church.
Catholic bishops also engaged in more aggressive means of opposition to
Reagan's nuclear policies. Bishop Leroy Matthieson led a movement agamst a factory in
Amarillo, Texas that produced materials for nuclear weapons. In 1981, Matthieson
strongly criticized the Reagan AdmmistratlOn's decision to stockpile and to produce the
radiation enhanced neutron warhead. He further urged workers at the factory in
Amarillo, Texas, "to consider what they are domg" and "seek employment in peaceful
pursuits.,,6 In 1982, Matthieson received $10,000 in contributions to develop a trust fund
to give counseling and financial aid to workers leaving the Amarillo plant. Archbishop
Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle, Washington, advocated more disruptive levels of
resistance than Matthieson. He argued in ]981 that the United States was keeping its






He urged Catholics to target the Internal Revenue Service by withdrawing their income
tax payments as a protest to Reagan's defense bui Idup7
The strongest fonn of opposition offered by the Catholic Church against the
Reagan Administration came in the drafting of a pastoral letter in 1983. This letter,
written by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), became the official
position of the church in the United States. The drafting of this letter revealed the strong
presence of Catholic resistance to Reagan's nuclear policies. In July of 1981, the NCCB
began the process of writing this document by fonning an ad hoc committee to prepare
the letter in Julv of 1981. Between this date and June 1982, the committee interviewed
former and present government members along with religious leaders. s The first draft of
the letter stated the church's reluctant acceptance of deterrence as a means of preventing
a nuclear war. This initial version criticized peace advocates in the church for opposing
deterrence without offering an alternative plan that would ensure United States' security.
The authors strongly stated their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons on population
centers under any circumstance. This initial draft also stated the church's objection to
any "destabilizing" weapons to the nuclear baJance 9 Despite not condemmng deterrence,
this initial letter is a clear statement against the Reagan Administration's modernization
plans.
Peace advocates within the Catholic church forced a second drafting of the letter.
They were angered that the initial draft did not take a sufficiently strong position agaInst
the existence of nuclear weapons and the policies of the Reagan Admimstration. The
peace elements of the church objected to the committee allowing Weinburger to testify.
The second draft included stronger attacks on the Reagan Administration. This version
rejected the administration's '"quest for superiority" over the Soviets and instead stated






only the "sufficiency to deter" was necessary. 10 Upon its release, the second draft drew
harsh criticism from the Reagan Administration and conservative elements of the
Catholic Church. The NCCB was not the only source of American Catholic opinion on
nuclear war during Reagan's presidency. A less critical stance on the morality of nuclear
weapons can be seen in the 1983 work of Catholic author David Hollenbach, Nuclear
Ethics: A Christian Moral Argument. He argued nuclear weapons had value if used for
"threat without use." Hollenbach believed nuclear weapons were allowable if used to
keep the peace. This view was shared by the French and West Gennan Catholic
bishops. J I These elements of the church played a substantial role in encouraging the
drafting of a third and final copy.
The final draft adopted in May of 1983 did not criticize the administration or the
policy of deterrence as strongly as the second version. Many peace advocates in the
church desired that the letter call for an immediate freeze in the production of nuclear
weapons. The final copy of the letter did not specifically call for a freeze in the buildup
of nuclear weapons. The final draft also conceded nuclear weapons were necessary for
the deterrence of the Soviet Union and national defense. The letter affirmed that
governments had the right to defend their people, but advocated this protection be
achieved through the use of conventional weapons. 12
The Reagan Administration was pleased with the final copy of the letter. An
administration spokesman stated the new draft was "substantially improved" over past
copies. The final draft was weaker in its direct criticisms of the administration compared
to the second copy. The condemnation of the administration's nuclear buildup, even in
the interest of encouraging arms treaties, remained in this final draft. The language of the
letter did not include specific approval for Reagan's policies. The second copy of the
'OIbid.,95.
'1Richard Miller, Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism. and the J ust-War




draft demonstrated that dramatic opposition to the president's policies within the Catholic
Church existed and that was not prevalent against the Carter admmistration. In addition,
Donald Davidson argued in 1983 that the Catholic Church was abandoning its adherence
of the use ofjust war criteria and was movmg to the position of "nuclear pacifism."'~
This statement and the content of the pastoral letter demonstrate a significant, but not
absolute portion of the American Catholic Church was aligned against Reagan's nuclear
policies from I98 I to 1983.
Evidence suggests that opposition in the Protestant churches to nuclear war had
also increased since 1978. Reasons for this movement include increases general funding
and in the development of new weapons systems. One group against nuclear buildup was
the National Council of Churches of Christ (NCC), a federation of 32 Protestant and
orthodox churches. The NCC had been mildly complimentary to Carter in its statements
but was more critical of the Reagan Admimstration. The NCC believed Reagan's
pursuit of nuclear superiority placed the nation at undue risk. The group accused the
administration oftuming the country "away from the uneasy d' etente of the past decade
and revIving the distorted version of the bipolar Cold War."14
Davidson concludes that concern about nuclear war had risen in the ranks of
United States' religious leaders during Reagan's first years. He argues that church
leaders advocation of "peacemaking" had "mushroomed in the last three years."'~ This
statement and the evidence in Davidson's work demonstrated a deterioration of trust and
approval in segments of the Catholic Church and American socidy concerning the
actions of the Reagan Administration's handling of nuclear defense. The increases in
spending in the interest of nuclear security had not gained the trust or approval of at least
a portion of the U.S. public.





President Reagan's nuclear buildup created resistance, fear, and controversy in
other elements of society. This fear was expressed by the mass media during Reagan's
first two years in office. In October 1983, the American Broadcast Company (ABC)
aired their original film, "The Day After," in prime time. The film dealt with the effects
of nuclear war on the residents of Lawrence, Kansas. Shown on two consecutive nights,
the film highlighted the difficulties the population would encounter surviving in a posl-
nuclear war environment. The film specifically focused on one family. Through their
experiences, the film chronicles the breakdown of law enforcement, medical support, and
communication technologies. The subject family has difficulty locating adequate food
and water to maintain themselves. The film also included disturbing depictions of the
prevalence ofradiation and disease in the aftermath of the war. 16 The film concluded
with the statement "The catastrophic effects you have just witnessed are, in all likelihood,
less severe than the destruction that would OCCUr."17 The disturbing content of the film
created increased debate over the arms control record of the Reagan Admmistratlon.
The portions of the film concerning the biological effects of nuclear war increased
public awareness and scientific discussion on the realitIes of a post-nuclear world. In
response to the film's depiction of the effects on Lawrence, many scientists argued this
movie "sanitized" the negative aspects of a nuclear conflict. Scientists argued that the
film failed to portray in an adequate manner what they believed would be medical
problems after a nuclear conflict. They stated the film was maccurate because it did not
show many of the widespread problems they believed would occur, such as heavy bums,
radiation sickness, vomit, and diarrhea. Dr. Carl Sagan, astrophysicist at Cornell
University, also stated that in target areas for a nuclear missile, the sky would be "pitch
black for several days" totally impairing vision for survivors. Sagan pointed to scientific
'6Richard Schwartz, Cold War Culture: Media and the Arts, 1945- I990 (New
York: Facts on File, 1998),74
I~ew York Times, 12 November 1983,19.
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evidence that after a massive exchange depicted in the "Day After," conditions would be
much worse. He argued after a major conflict, the Northern Hemisphere would be totally
uninhabitable and that only small bands of hunters and gatherers would remain in the rest
of the world. At a another conference on the effects of nuclear war, The Federal
Emergency Management Agency concluded semi-rural areas, such as Lawrence, might
face even greater disaster than the film described.l~
Widespread concern arose as to the effects "The Day After" would have on
children. During the week prior to the film's airing, the children's show "Mr. Roger's
Neighborhood" ran five half-hour shows on children's anxieties about nuclear war. Dr.
Robert Simon, director of clinical trainmg at the Ackennan lnstitutl: for Family Therapy,
also voiced concerns. He recommended fam il ies or even h'TOUPS of fam iIies watch the
film together and that parents not allow children to view the film alone. Dr. Dorothy
Singer of Yale University, stated that the film could be developmentally damaging to
children. She argued that ABC missed its goal of creating "nuclear aversion" and instead
created potential for widespread fear and panic towards nuclear war. She stated her fears
that children would have nightmares about the film and worry about for weeks or even
months. Family therapist Dr. Kenneth Porter further advised parents not to allow
children to view any panel discussions held after the film. He believed seeing more
infonnation "would lock feelings of despair and fatalism" inside children. 19 New York
City school officials sent a memo to superintendents and principals recommending
children under the age of 12 not see the film. School officicials also stated the "Day
After" could create feelings of hopelessness. 2o Thus, the film created widespread concern
among educators and physicians over the issue of nuclear war and its effects in many
areas of society.
18Ibid., 21 November 1983,19
19Ibid., 7 November 1983,16.
2°Ibid, 7 November 1983, )6.
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Conservative supporters of the administration's nuclear defense plans were
critical of the "Day After" and the message sent by the film. Reverend Jerry Falwell
called the film a "pre-emptive strike" in the debate over nuclear arms. He demanded
ABC allot time for his group, the Moral Majority, to present their point of view on
nuclear defense. Phyllis Schlafly of the "Eagle Forum," which she described as a "pro-
family" group requested ABC affiliates allow the'm to air contrasting vIews in a "two-
hour political editorial ."21
The Reagan administration also took a stance on the film. David Gergen,
campaign director for the president, declared the fi 1m did nOl address the most important
issue to the nation: how to prevent the events in the movie from becoming a reality.
Gergen stated those who view the film should be aware of the administration's plan to
reduce the risks of war. He admitted the film had the potential to create anti-govemmenL
sentiment. 22 Secretary of State George Shultz took a different approach to the film. He
felt the film val idated the president's efforts to nuclear arms reductIon, which had
produced no tangible results at this date. He argued the film "dramatizes the
unacceptability" of nuclear conflict, but that it did represent the future. Shultz argued the
fi 1m states "to those who have criticized the President for seeking arms reductions that
this is the course to take.'>23 He stated the proper course of action to the threat of nuclear
war was to support the president's policies. 24 This attention from the administration and
its conservative supporters to this film shows the vulnerability of their nuclear doctrine to
public opinion. They were seeking to avoid the possibility of this movie creatIng
additional resistance to their nuclear doctrine. Political opponents of President Reagan
and anti-nuclear activists used the film to increase their influence on the questIon of
nuclear defense and arms reduction to the public. The New York Times declared the film
21Jbid., 17 NOvember 1983,20.
22Jbid., ]7 November 1983,20.
2JIbid., 21 November 1983,1.
24Ibid., 21 November 1983, 1.
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had the potential to damage the president if viewers came away from the film supporting
a nuclear freeze or unilateral disarmament. Groups and individuals opposed to Reagan's
nuclear policy engaged in serious attempts to use the film to achieve this goal. Steven
Solomon, aide to Congressman Thomas Downey, an advocate of a mutual and verifiable
nuclear freeze, stated the "left was fairly unahashed about using the film to further freeze
and arms control."25 Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara argued that the
Reagan AdministratlOn could do more in the realm of arms control, stating the reduction
of warheads per-missile as one possible option. To the possibility of mobilizing
opposition to the president's policies, anti-nuclear activist David Cartright stated "I vie\-\'
next week as an electric moment when interest will peak," after the film. 26
A series of ant-nuclear advertisements arose in the in the weeks followmg the
movIe. The 800-NUCLEAR project, supported by many disarmament groups, purchased
$200,000 for advertising the week following the film's broadcast. This group's
advertisement showed a United States and Soviet general inflating a balloon that
exploded into a nuclear cloud. The ad was followed by a toll free phone number for
viewers to call to get involved in the nuclear freeze movement. The Center for Defense
Information, led by former military officers, aired an advertisement featuring actor Paul
Nev.man. In the ad, Newman offered a phone number for viewers to call and obtain a
"nuclear war prevention kit."27 The Union ofConcemed Scientists place an add in the
New York Times on November 21, after the first broadcast of the film. The ad stated
that the "Day After" was only a television program and that "you and your family are still
alive." The ad went on to tell readers "In case you lost some sleep last night," they could
mail the coupon at the bottom of the add to obtain information about the group, make a
monetary donation, or hear information about how to aid the group through volunteer
25fbid., 17 November 1983,20.
26lbid., 17 November] 983,20.
27fbid., 17 November 1983, 20.
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activities. 2R These groups were playIng off the significant emotional shock of the movie
to create support for their groups and opposition to the administration's nuclear policies.
These groups believed the film would awaken and increase existing opposition to the
current nuclear situation. The fact conservatives reacted to the film with such strenbrth
shows the film was an important catalyst for nuclear opposition movements.
The reaction from those who viewed the movie was a mix of shock and
resignation. During the film's first showing on November 20, 1,000 viewers caJle9 ABC
affiliates. Three screenings of the film in Lawrence and Kansas City, Missouri drew
similar reactions. Holh Hartman, age 12 from Lawrence, stated that "It was scary to
think about what will happen."29 Patty Lucas of Atlanta, expressed her sentiments by
stating "'Either they do it to us or we do it to them, as long as we have the same amount of
power it's okay. "30 To the overall effect of the fi 1m, the New York Times stated it was
"shaping up to be a national viewing phenomenon," citing the massive planned group
viewi ngs of the film in schools, churches, and town halls across the nation.)\ The
hroadcast of this film created a wave of discussion of the value and considerable
opposition to President Reagan's nuclear doctrine and arms control record. This devotion
of prime time network television to this subject was unprecedented. The
concern about the president's nuclear policies was clearly growing in the nation.
Other media outlets reflected evidence of an increased public awareness of the
threat of nuclear war and conflict with the Soviet Union can be found in relation to media
outlets. This fact is argued in secondary literature on this subject. In, The End of Victory
Culture, Tom Englehardt argues that the Reagan presidency created a "Lucas-like"
reconstruction of war at the governmental level, referring to the heroic "Star Wars"
trilogy of movies. He claims Reagan took on a sense of pursuing "victory" in his
nlbid., 21 November 1983, J5
29lbid., 2 J November J983, 19.
JOTbid., 21 November J983, 18.
3Ilbid., 17 November J983,20.
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speeches regarding foreign policy, nuclear arms, and relations with the Soviet Union.)'
However, the positive effects of these references must be balanced with the effects of
films such as the "Day After," which portrayed nuclear war in negative terms and created
fear instead ofa sense of confidence or victory.
The increase in the amount of anti-nuclear literature produced during Reagan's
early years also mdicates an increase In the activities and strength of sentiment against
the administration's programs. One aspect of this literature was a sympathy for the
Soviet public. In Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons, Douglas Lackey argued the
Soviet people were innocent because of their inability to influence the policies of their
government. He contended they would remain innocent even in the event of a Soviet
first-strike. He further argued Soviet citizens had the right to life regardless of the actions
of their government, even after an aggressive pre-emptive nuclear movement by the
Soviet Union.)) In Against the State of NucIear Terror, Joel Kovel called for the public to
rise in more active opposition to the government's nuclear policies. He argued that the
nation was suffering from "nuclear terror" created by government oppression and
intimidation of the publtc. Kovel argued that a State possessing nuclear weapons must be
willing to destroy its own society to attain its goals through the use of nuclear weapons.·14
He called on people to rise above traditional methods of nuclear protest such as writing,
protesti ng, and marching because these methods were not sufficiently mfl uencing
governments. He felt that the energy devoted to nuclear protest should be proportionate
to the effort governments were giving to create nuclear terror within the public. Instead,
he stated anti-nuclear movements should no longer react to the government, but initIate
32Tom Englehardt, The End of VictoI}' Culture: Cold War America and the
Disol1usioning of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995),270.
DDouglas Lackey. Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman & Allanhe1d, 1984.




their own agenda. 35 Kovel called the mitial years of the Reagan Administration
"practically a continuous exercise in nuclear thuggery and blackmail" consistent with his
definition of nuclear terror. 36 He also spoke of the rise in activity in anti-nuclear
movements. He argued in 1984, that the anti-nuclear movement had been growing in the
past three years at an '"impressive scope." His statements of anger at the Reagan
Administration suggested its activities were significant in encouraging the growth of
nuclear protest moments.
More evidence about the rise of antI-nuclear movements in Reagan's early years
came in a wave of protests in October of 1983. These protests were against additional
deployments of United States' Pershing II missiles in Europe. Arrests numbered 1,100
over one weekend during 140 anti-nuclear rallies natIOnwide. Anti-nuclear activities
included trespassing on weapon production centers and human blockading of roadways to
inhibit vehicles canying components for nuclear weapons.~7
In addition, polls conducted in 1983 indicated overall public opinion was shifting
against the admmistration's nuclear probrram. A New York Times/CBS poll showed that
the public felt the United States was no longer trailing the Soviet Union in nuclear
prowess, and mcreases in nuclear spending were no longer necessary. The poll numbers
showed 48% of United States residents felt the government was spending too much
money on defense. Republican Congressman Dan Coats further argued this point by
stating the public consensus on the need for nuclear spending had eroded in the last two
years. He argued members of his district had turned against the "blank-check mentalIty
of the defense department. "38
Anti-nuclear movements had significant effects on the policies of the Reagan
AdministratIOn. One movement that had particular influence on the administration was
35Ibid.,206.
36Ibid.,35.
)1New York Times, 25 October 1983,20.
38Ibid., 6 February 1983, 12.
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the nuclear freeze movement, which called for an immediate end to the procurement of
newannaments. Reagan publicly criticized the movement and its ideals. He felt a
nuclear freeze would threaten United States' security by perpetuating its nuclear
inferiority to the Soviet Union and decreasing the chances for reaching anns reduction
treaties. J9 However, authors such as Robert Tucker argue that the strength of this nuclear
freeze movement and other protest groups did influence the president's actions. He
believes the public outcry over nuclear bui Idup was a motivation for commitment to
research programs that were defensive in nature, such as SD1. 411
Evidence indicates rising criticism of nuclear policies effected the actions of the
Reagan Administration. A New York Times report indicated the administration was
delaying a $10,000 purchase of morphine sulfate, a pain-killing drug held in reserve for
civil defense purposes The New York Times stated this delay was aimed at diffusing
public fear the nation was preparing for a limited nuclear war. This report also claimed a
large debate iosued over delaying this purchase and its implications on public opinion
and national security41 This story gives further evidence that the public's growing
opposition to the administration's nuclear policies had substantial effects.
The reaction to the threat of nuclear war was strongly negative during the
Carter administration and the first two years of the Reagan Administration. From 1976 to
1982, more articles appeared on nuclear weapons and their implications on national
security. By 1982, the number of articles on this subject was second only to 1964 in
United States' history42 It is true that public opinion was strongly aligned against the
nuclear doctrine of the Carter administration. ]t is important to note that the Reagan
administration campaigned in 1980 on the promise of improving national security
39Ronald Reagan, "Anns Control Policy," Vital Speeches of the Dav 49 (April
1983): 394.
4£Tucker, SDI and U.S. Foreign Policy, 10.
41New York Times, 25 October 1983,20.
42Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of (mages, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1988), 376.
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compared to conditions under Carter and made further promises to alleviate this problem
in rapid fashion in the first months of hIs presidency. By )983, significant portions of the
public held an equally bad, ifnot worse, opinion towards national security and the threat
of nuclear war. This opinion was greatly innuenced by the rise of antI-nuclear messages
in the media and by pockets of protest groups. The difference between public fears
during the two administrations is that instead of fearing United States' nuclear inferiority
would lead to conflict, by 1983, the public feared their OW11 president's nuclear buildup




CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FIRST THREE YEARS
IN OFFICE
In 1981, President Reagan took office under bleak conditions in defense and
foreign policy. The Carter administration had suffered several setbacks in its nuclear
doctrine. In the first three years of his tenn, President Caner believed that the Soviet
Union shared his weariness of the Cold War. Perhaps due to this belief, the Carter
administration showed reluctance to modernize United States' nuclear forces. Carter
blocked the procurement of the MX missile and B-I Bomber for his entire presidency.
The Soviet Union did not show a desire to end hostilities or slow down the development
of its nuclear forces as Carter believed it would. Military analysts stated the Soviet
Union was moving toward the goal of "escalation dominance" over the United States in
its nuclear forces. Public opimon polls demonstrated the public's belief the country was
falling dangerously behind the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. Many also believed the
Soviet nuclear buildup was beginning to threaten United States' national security because
of a decline of U.S. nuclear defense abilities.
These problems in nuclear policy were linked to problems in foreign policy for
the Carter administration. The Soviet Union was becoming more aggressive in its
attempts to increase its influence over other nations through the promotl0n of its brand of
communism in nations such as Poland, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. The Soviet Union's
gains in the nuclear and military balance against the United States gave it more
confidence to pursue these goals. Publ ic opinion in the United States showed its citIzens




The Soviet Union was also successful in creating indecision among the Carter
administration and its European allies over the proper course of nuclear policy. The
Soviet government and its media outlets felt confident that their propaganda campaign
against additional deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe was successful in stopping
the United States and its allies from modernizing their forces. Critics of the
administration argued that this delay increased the Soviet's ability to increase its nuclear
advantages over the United States.
The Carter Administration suffered a major setback with the defeat of SALT II in
Congress. The adminIstration devoted a great deal of its energy and influence to
negotiating the terms of this treaty with the Soviets. Carter felt the treaty would be a
positive step towards reducing both nation's nuclear arsenals on equitable terms. This
important defeat showed the admInistration's lack ofleadership and influence within the
United States. The failure of SALT II also advertised the weakness of the administration
in respect to the rest of the world. In addition, critics of the administration stated the
tenns of the failed SALT II would further weaken the American nuclear position against
the Soviet Union. Thus, the treaty was further evidence of the decline in the U.S. nuclear
defense capabilities under the Carter administration.
The administration's failure to encourage the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
to improve their human rights stance was another setback. This goal was one of the
central thrusts of the administration's policies on the Soviet Union. Despite considerable
effort, the admInistratIOn made negligible impact on the human rights policies of the
Soviet Union. This unsuccessful attempt at changing the human rights pol icies of the
Soviet Union actually served as a hindrance to Carter's diplomatic relations. Carter's
increasingly critical statements against the human rights violations of the Soviet
government poisened nuclear reduction talks between the nations, hardening Soviet
negotiators against compromise in the face of cliticism of their human rights actions.
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In 1979, President Carter deviated from his policy of restrained modernization
and deployment of nuclear weapons. He was vastly criticized by political and military
analysts for compromising his policIes in the face of public demand. This change was
encouraged by Carter's falling public approval ratings on defense and foreign policy.
One initiative by the Carter Administration designed to curb the advantages gained by
the Soviets ill their nuclear modernization program was a joint initiative \-vith NATO in
December of 1979 to deploy over 600 missiles in Europe. This was an important move
because it shows a fundamental change in the nuclear policies of the Caner
Administration. The president moved away from his policy to negotiate with the Soviets
at the current strength of his nuclear arsenal. He now began a nuclear buildup of his Ov,,11
in the face of Soviet modernization and the lack of a substantial arms reduction treaty
The Reagan Administration would later adopt this policy.
Another part of this change in policy came in Presidential Directive 59. This
program called for the development of new nuclear weapons to target Soviet missile silos
and industrial centers needed for the war-making capabilities. This initiative did not
Impress the Soviet Union. The Soviets doubted the feasibility of this program because
many of the weapons systems would not be available until the second halfofthe 19&0'5.
The Soviets also doubted the survivability of these new systems once the technology
became available to deploy them.
The 1980 NATO bui Idup and Presidential Directive 59 did not enhance President
Carter's ability to negotiate arms reduction treaties or conduct foreign policy from a
position of greater strength. This was largely because the Caner administration had lost
substantial credibility in respect to its nuckar doctrine. Public opinion polls and a Jack of
cooperation in Congress were manifestations of the belief in the United States that the
administration had lost direction in its defense and foreign policy affairs. The nation's
allies worried about the United States' ability to defend them from Soviet nuclear and
conventional aggression. The Soviet Umon believed its diplomatic and propaganda
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efforts had curbed nuclear modernization by Carter and doubted American resolve to
maIntam a credible nuclear defense. Even though it began to modernize the nation's
nuclear forces In 1979, the administration had lost world wide credibility and influence.
During Carter' s presidency, conservatives on military defense continually
attacked him for allowing the Soviet Union to gain advantages in the nuclear balance.
Specifically, analysts feared that the Soviet modernization would lead to vulnerability In
a limited nuclear conflict. They argued the Soviets were continually gaining throw
weight and numerical advantages which would aHow them to engage in a first strike with
a reduced number of its nuclear weapons. Analysts bel ieved this would force the United
States to retaliate in mass with its nuclear forces or conserve lts forces. This was because
the Soviet Union could afford to leave nuclear weapons in reserve in a small attack while
the United States could not engage in a similar limited strike. Thus, many analysts and
conservatives feared the nation's defense, foreign policy abilities, and national security
were being diminished by inferiority to the Soviet Union.
Ronald Reagan took advantage of concerns over the lack of credibility in Carter's
nuclear policies. He heavily criticized Carter's ability to defend the natIOn and its allies
from the aggression of the Soviet Union. He adopted the criticism of conservatives that
the Soviet Union had moved closer to nuclear superiority under the watch of Jimmy
Carter. Reagan pointed to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and Ethiopia in conjunctIOn
with Cuba as evidence of the rise of a communist threat to the United States. He
promised to curb the aggression of the Soviet Union through modernizatIOn of the United
States' military and specifically, nuclear force. The nuclear and foreign policies of the
candidates were key elements in Reagan's victory in the presidential election of 1980.
In the first year of its existence, the Reagan Administration made promises to
increase the level of national security for the United States in rapid fasion. In 1981,
Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinburger introduced their plan to induce the Soviet
Union to negotiate arms reduction treaties. He believed the Soviets had no motivation to
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negotiate while they were gaining strategic advantages over the United States. He
proposed that the United States begin modernizing I1s nuclear forces by beginning
production of many of the weapons systems Carter had opposed, such as the MX missile
and 8-1 bomber. He argued that this modernization would Increase the strength of the
U.S. nuclear forces. From thiS position of strength, the United States could persuade the
Soviets to negotiate affilS reduction treaties. Reagan declared this modernization plan
would quickly alleviate national defense problems and force the Soviets to negotiate. In
1981, Weinburger stated the administration's proposed budget for nuclear defense would
"significantly and quickly strengthen" the nation's nuclear position. l The New York
Times declared that Congress passed the vast majority of Reagan's nuclear requests in
198 I with little opposition.:! Also, Weinburger declared in 1983 that "we are beginning
to catch up" to the Soviets in the nuclear balance.) The Reagan administration promIsed
to increase national security through increased nuclear strength and arms reduction
treaties. This plan received the support of the Congress and the public opinion polls In
1981. In 1983, the secretary of defense declared substantial progress to improving the
nations nuclear defense position against the Soviets. The question that must be asked IS if
this administration fulfilled its promises of security and affilS in reduction after achieving
its 1981 requested gains in nuclear weaponry.
Despite the initial successes in gaining funds for modernization, Reagan's
nuclear program suffered setbacks. Public opinion polls, though limited in measuring all
aspects of American society, indicated in 1983 that a substantial portion of the public
believed too much money was being spent on defense. These polls also indicated that
many U.S. citizens believed a equitable strategic balance existed between the
superpowers in 1983. Thus, a considerable percentage of the pubhc saw no need for
INe'\' York Times, 5 March 1981, 1.
2Ibid., 15 May 1981. 15.
3Ibid., 10 March 1983, 1.
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increases in spending on nuclear defense. Congressional leaders foHowed suit in backing
away from the president's proposals. Congress began slashing budget requests of the
administration in 1982 and 1983. Even members of the Republican party criticized the
president's increasingly high demand for spending on nuclear weapons Congressional
leaders voiced their support for increases in defense spending, but not at the high rate
asked by the Reagan administration. Weinburger and Reagan resisted negotiation of
lower budget totals. Congress also began to question the effectiveness and feasibility of
Reagan's nuclear doctrine. This deterioratIon of support for the president's nuclear
policies limited the funds Reagan was able to get allotted for nuclear defense in the 1983
and 1984 fiscal years. The inability of the administration to foster congressional support
in 1982 and 1983 was a drawback of Reagan's first three years. Reagan was able to gain
substantial increases in nuclear spending. Despite congressIOnal resistance, Reagan
increased spending on nuclear weapons at a higher rate than any past president in his
1981 budget.4
A severe flaw that arose in the president's nuclear doctrine was his reliance on
technology still in development. Many of the programs that were allotted funds were not
projected to be technologically feasible until the later half of the decade. This was a
problem because the admInistration had promised rapid results after its 1981 nuclear
defense budget was approved.
The president's nuclear doctrine had an adverse effect on United States' foreign
policy from 1981 to 1983. The primary failure in this period was the adminIstration's
inability to negotiate an arms reduction treaty. Reagan and Weinburger promised arms
reduction treaties through increases in U.S. nuclear strength. Although vast amounts of
funds were allotted to nuclear weapons, thIS spending did not produce the promised
treaties. Instead, both nations continued to increase theIr nuclear arsenals from 1981 to
4Ibld., 20 March 1982, 1
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1983. This fact was not beneficial to national security.
Another negative result of Reagan's doctrine was the \>,'avenng of European
support for U.S nuclear defense program. Britain and France felt the administration's
buildup was not allotted for their benefit. They believed the patterns of American nuclear
weapon and defense procurement increased the chances of a limited nuclear war.
Europeans feared this limited nuclear conflict would be fought on their continent and thal
North America would be spared of the effects. American allies saw' SOl as a prime
exampJe of this attempt by the United States to spare itself from the effects of nuclear war
while leaving Europe unprotected, because the Reagan administration demonstrated no
intent to protect Europe with this system. The only reason European protest against SDI
did not reach extremely high levels was that the allies of the U.S. doubted the feasibility
of the technology required for the program. Thus, they questioned the credibility of
Reagan's nuclear doctrine while standing against its intended purpose.
The reaction within U. S. society against Reagan's nuclear program was strong.
Books began to be published at an increased rate on the dangers of Reagan's nuclear
buildup. Films depicted the effects of nuclear war. This release of media material served
as a catalyst for nuclear protest groups and their goals. Many groups attempted to
capitalize on the shock value of the film "The Day After" that depicted the effects of
nuclear war on Lawrence, Kansas One of the most influential blTOUps that arose against
the pol icies of Reagan was the Nuclear Freeze Movement. This blTOUP called for the
immediate end to the building of new nuclear weapons. This group had substantial
impact on government pol icy. The United States House of Representatives approved an
initiative calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze of nuclear weapons buildup that was
close in content to the goals of the Nuclear Freeze Movement In addition, nuclear
protest movements. and their effects on the public influenced the policies of the Reagan
Administration. Evidence suggests that the SOl program was an attempted answer to the
strong outcry against procurement of offensive nuclear forces. The Reagan
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Administration began to delay other actions towards its nuclear doctrine to avoid creating
public fear and resistance.
The results of this study slightly contrast with the conclusions of Lou Cannon and
Mark Lagon who studied the overa]] military practices of the Reagan Administration.
The evidence of this study, concerning events from 1981 to 1983, shows President
Reagan was a strong influence on Secretary of De·fense Weinburger This IS partIcularly
true concerning the formulation of national defense budgets and negotiating these
proposals to Congress.
In addition, the findings of this work refine some of the existing secondary
arguments comparing the Reagan Administration in respect to past presidencies. The
evidence presented in this work shows Reagan engaged in unprecedented spending from
1981 to 1983, while producing no arms reduction treaties. This conclusion is a contrast
from the argument of Louisa Hulett's contention that the Reagan administration's
position was similar to many other presidents in diplomatic, military, and foreign
policies. In addition, the Reagan Administration was not the first to take strong stands
against the SovIet Union, as Jay Wink suggests. President Carter for one made strong,
but flawed stands on his demands for human rights improvements by the Soviet Union.
Perhaps a synthesis of these two interpretations is correct. President Reagan engaged in
increasingly aggressive measures against the Soviet Union through his nuclear doctrine.
However, these aggressive policies produced unfavorable results from 1981 to 1983
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